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DISABILITY, VULNERABILITY, AND THE LIMITS OF 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
Ani B. Satz∗ 
Abstract: Despite the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 
disabled Americans face substantial barriers to entry into the workplace, lack material 
supports including health care and transportation, and may not receive reasonable 
accommodation that best supports their functioning. In addition, individuals with 
impairments have difficulty qualifying as disabled for disability protections. In light of these 
problems, some commentators suggest that a civil rights or antidiscrimination approach to 
disability discrimination—an approach for which activists fought for twenty years prior to 
the enactment of the ADA—may not adequately address disability discrimination. Some 
critics advocate a return to the social welfare model that ADA activists struggled to avoid, 
namely, a model focused on material supports for disabled persons. 
I argue that reforming disability law requires a blend of the civil rights and social welfare 
models as informed by a novel lens: vulnerability as universal and constant. The current 
antidiscrimination approach to disability law reform is limited because it views disability as a 
narrow identity category and fragments disability protection. Fragmentation, a new concept I 
develop in this Article, results when susceptibility to disability discrimination is treated as if 
it arises in discrete environments, such as the workplace and particular places of public 
accommodation. Viewing vulnerabilities as situational generates a host of problems: it results 
in a patchwork of protections that do not coalesce to allow meaningful social participation, 
fails to appreciate the hyper-vulnerability (extreme sensitivity) of disabled individuals to 
certain environmental changes, artificially restricts the protected class by creating a false 
perception that some individuals with significant impairments are not disabled because they 
are able to function in particular circumstances or environments, and disregards the benefits 
of conceptualizing vulnerability to impairments as affecting disabled and nondisabled 
persons alike. 
Interpreting Martha Fineman’s theory of vulnerability and applying it for the first time 
within disability legal studies, I argue that vulnerability to disability and the vulnerabilities 
disabled individuals experience more acutely than those without disability are both universal 
and constant. The shared vulnerabilities of disabled and nondisabled individuals suggest the 
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need to restructure completely social institutions to respond to barriers to work and social 
participation. For practical reasons, I advocate a compromise focused on disabled persons 
with regard to accommodation for employment and some aspects of social participation: a 
move away from the standard antidiscrimination approach, which fragments protections, to 
an approach that treats vulnerability as extending across environments and enables a broader 
provision of material supports for disabled individuals. In particular, the reasonable 
accommodation mandate should be expanded with governmental supports to allow disabled 
workers accommodations both inside and outside the workplace that facilitate their 
employment. Additionally, a dialogue between employers and employees about 
accommodating disability should be mandatory, and employees should be entitled to 
reasonable accommodation that supports their preferred methods of functioning. Given the 
current legal structures in place, however, recognizing vulnerability to illness as universal 
suggests the need for universal health care, or treating access to health care as a matter of 
social welfare rather than disability law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In many ways, the future of American disability law depends on the 
continued role of a civil rights or antidiscrimination approach to 
disability discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
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(ADA)1 recognizes disability as a protected class2 and creates a mandate 
against discrimination in the employment, service, and public 
accommodation contexts.3 The ADA is a civil rights statute premised on 
notions of formal equality,4 providing equal opportunity to individuals 
identified as disabled under the Act.5 While the ADA requires some 
material accommodations to facilitate entry into public places,6 access to 
public services and transportation,7 and workplace functioning,8 it is an 
unfunded mandate. Congress did not intend the reasonable 
accommodation provision to serve as a social welfare measure but as a 
civil rights requirement; in fact, Congress viewed reasonable 
accommodation as a means to avoid dependency by increasing access to 
the workforce and facilitating social participation.9 
As a formal statement that the government recognizes and opposes 
discrimination against disabled persons, the ADA is successful on its 
face.10 Additionally, the lives of some disabled individuals have 
undoubtedly been improved as a result of its passage. Workers with 
                                                     
1. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000), amended 
by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
2. Id. § 12101(a)(7) (“[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority[.]”). While 
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 strikes this language, it retains the threshold test for protected 
class membership. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555(2008). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (employment); § 12132 (public services including transportation); § 12182 
(public accommodation and public transportation operated by private entities). 
4. Id. § 12101(a)(7)–(9) (discussing disability as a protected class, equality of opportunity, and 
the need for disabled individuals to “compete on an equal basis”). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. §§ 12183–84. 
7. Id. §§ 12142–48, 12184. 
8. Id. § 12111(9). 
9. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Subcomm. 
on the Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 7 (1989) 
(statement of Rep. Tony Coelho) (“We are not looking for welfare . . . . We just want an opportunity 
to be able to live and be able to have an opportunity to work . . . to be productive citizens. We know 
that there is going to have to be accommodations to give us our basic civil rights.”); see also 
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 636–40 (2004) (discussing congressional intent to 
address the exclusion of disabled persons from the workforce with the reasonable accommodation 
mandate). 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3); see also Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil 
Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 37 (2000) (“[T]he ADA was critically important 
to the establishment of a major federal commitment to the mission of employing people with 
disabilities and providing them with vastly expanded access to public programs and 
accommodations.”). 
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hidden disabilities are no longer subject to pre-employment exams.11 
Buildings are more accessible to individuals with mobility 
impairments.12 Evidence suggests that the most egregious acts of 
discriminatory exclusion may be in the past.13 Further, the ADA serves 
as model legislation in more than forty-six countries.14 
Nevertheless, disabled individuals continue to face some of the same 
unemployment and isolation issues that motivated Congress to enact the 
ADA. First, depending on which studies one finds compelling, 
employment rates of disabled persons are either unimproved15 or lower16 
                                                     
11. See Paul Steven Miller, The EEOC’s Enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 
the Sixth Circuit, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV.  217, 221 (1998) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)). 
12. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government 
Services, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,469 (proposed June 17, 2008) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35) 
(proposing regulations to address commentator views that “more than seventeen years after the 
enactment of the ADA, as facilities are becoming physically accessible to individuals with 
disabilities, the Department [of Justice] needs to focus on second-generation issues that ensure . . . 
accessible elements . . . such as ticketing in assembly areas and reservations of boat slips.”); see also 
153 CONG. REC. S10211 (2007) (Statement of Sen. Harkin) (“We have made great advances: . . . 
curb cuts, accessible buses, accessible trains, widened doors. Every building now built in the United 
States of America is fully accessible.”). But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited 
Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) 
(“[T]estimony from advocates across the country affirms that many if not most businesses remain 
inaccessible, even in circumstances where it would be easy to remove barriers.”). 
13. See 153 CONG. REC. S10210–11 (2007) (Statement of Sen. Harkin) (“[W]hen I first came to 
the House and then to the Senate to work on these issues, the issues [were about] the discrimination 
against Americans with disabilities and how people with disabilities had been kept out of the 
mainstream of American life, how they had been shunted aside, warehoused, categorized in ways 
that demean their personhood in ways that prevented them from contributing all they could to our 
American society . . . . We now include people with disabilities under a broad civil rights 
umbrella . . . . We have made great advances since that time.”); see also Paul Steven Miller, 
Reclaiming the Vision: The ADA and Definition of Disability, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 769, 777 (2003) (“I 
was told [in the 1980s] by one law firm that even though they personally did not have a problem 
with my size [short stature], they feared that their clients would think that they were running . . . ‘a 
circus freak show’ if their clients were to see me as a lawyer in their firm.”); cf. Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on the Handicapped and the H. 
Subcomm. on Select Educ., 100th Cong. 75 (1988) (statement of Judith Heumann, World Inst. of 
Disability) (“In 1981, an attempt was made to forceably [sic] remove me and another disabled 
friend [in wheelchairs] from an auction house because we were ‘disgusting to look at.’”). 
14. Sharona Hoffman et al., The Definition of Disability in the Americans With Disabilities Act: 
Its Successes and Shortcomings: Proceedings of the 2005 Annual Meeting, Association of American 
Law Schools Sections on Employment Discrimination Law; Labor Relations and Employment Law; 
and Law, Medicine and Health Care, 9 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 473, 492 (2005). 
15. See, e.g., DAVID C. STAPLETON, RICHARD V. BURKHAUSER & ANDRED J. HUNTVILLE, HAS 
THE EMPLOYMENT RATE OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES DECLINED? 1–4 (2004), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/edicollect/92 (discussing a decline in the employment of 
disabled individuals of working age based on Current Population Survey Data), permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n15.pdf; Daron Acemoglu & 
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than before the passage of the ADA. Commentators believe that fear of 
costly accommodation17 or litigation18 may be disincentives for firms to 
hire disabled workers. 
Second, lack of sufficient supports—including health care and 
transportation—prevents many disabled persons from accessing or 
retaining jobs and thereby increases their isolation.19 Public wage and 
health benefits under Social Security are limited and may require a 
claimant to prove total and permanent disability, meaning, with some 
exceptions, that one cannot return to work and continue to receive the 
same Social Security benefits.20 The working disabled who have 
                                                     
Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 929 (finding a sharp decline in 1993 of the employment of 
disabled men between twenty-one and thirty-nine years old, and in 1992 a decline for women of the 
same age; both measurements are relative to the employment of workers without disability within 
the same age ranges); Kathleen Beegle & Wendy A. Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Disability 
Discrimination Laws, 38 J. HUM. RESOURCES 806, 850 (2003) (finding state disability 
discrimination laws did not result in a decrease in employment for disabled persons prior to the 
enactment of the ADA). 
16. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & J.J. Prescott, Disaggregating Employment Protection: The Case of 
Disability Discrimination, 5 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research Working Paper Services, 2004), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10740 (finding causal relation in years immediately 
following enactment of the ADA), permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n16.pdf; cf. John J. Donohue, III & James 
J. Heckman, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: Re-Evaluating 
Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEO. L.J. 1713 (1991) (arguing that civil rights protections 
decreased employment of persons of color). 
17. See, e.g., Jolls & Prescott, supra note 16 at 2. 
18. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15, at 917 (“[T]he negative effects of the ADA 
may have been due more to the costs of accommodation than to the threat of lawsuits for wrongful 
termination, though poor measurement of separation rates may also account for this result.”). But 
see Jolls & Prescott, supra note 16, at 4 (arguing that employee discharge litigation costs are not a 
factor in the employment of disabled individuals); cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of 
Limited Civil Rights Remedies, supra note 12 (arguing that litigation is a way of enforcing the 
reasonable accommodation mandate). 
19. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 26–34 (2004). 
The significance of health care coverage for employment may be overstated, however. Australians 
have universal health care and a three to four percent higher unemployment rate for disabled than 
nondisabled workers. See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Disability, Ageing and Careers: Summary 
of Findings (2003), at 26, available at http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ 
ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/978A7C78CC11B702CA256F0F007B1311/$File/44300_2003.pdf, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n19.pdf. 
20. Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is paid to individuals with previous sufficient 
payroll contributions. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN, 2008 RED BOOK, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/redbook/eng/overview-disability.htm [hereinafter RED BOOK], permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n20a.pdf. Monthly support 
increases with previous earnings, though the average estimate for 2008 is $1,004 to each individual 
per month. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN, FACT SHEET SOCIAL SECURITY: 2008 SOCIAL SECURITY 
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employee benefit plans may also not receive medical services necessary 
to manage the effects of their disabilities, as the ADA generally does not 
apply to the content of health insurance policies.21 While public 
transportation services are covered under the ADA,22 routes and vehicles 
are limited. As a result, disabled individuals compete with the growing 
elderly population over benefits such as Paratransit, which provides vital 
transportation for some disabled employees to and from the workplace.23 
Third, workplace accommodations remain contentious. An interactive 
process in which employees and employers discuss preferred 
accommodations is not federally mandated, meaning uniform 
requirements for the employer-employee dialogue do not exist.24 The 
                                                     
CHANGES, available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2008.pdf, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n20b.pdf. 
Recipients of SSDI are eligible for Medicare. See RED BOOK. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
is a means-tested program paying $637 per month in 2008. See id. Individuals receiving SSDI are 
also eligible for Medicaid. Id. Both SSDI and SSI benefits are predicated on an inability to work. 
See id. Under the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, individuals who 
return to work may be able to maintain limited health coverage and cash payments. Pub. L. No. 106-
170, 113 Stat. 1860 (1999) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-19 (2000)). Medicare beneficiaries may 
keep their insurance for eight and a half years. Id. § 202. Medicaid coverage may be extended or 
available for purchase. Id. § 201. Generally speaking, cash payments are phased out, given 
sufficient wages. See RED BOOK. 
21. Title III requires that health insurance offices be accessible as places of public 
accommodation, but health insurers may determine what health care services are covered under 
their policies, so long as distinctions are not made on the basis of disability. See Weyer v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000); McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 
179, 185–89 (5th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558–60 (7th Cir. 
1999); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–14 (3d Cir. 1998); Lenox v. Healthwise 
of Ky., Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 455–57 (6th Cir. 1998). But see Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 
F.3d 28, 32–33 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We believe an entity covered by Title III is not only obligated by 
the statute to provide disabled persons with physical access, but is also prohibited from refusing to 
sell them its merchandise by reason of discrimination against their disability.”). 
Similarly, Title II, which pertains to public services, does not apply to benefits coverage of state 
health care plans. See, e.g., Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 
1999).  
Under Title I, employers who act as insurers are prohibited from making “disability-based 
distinctions”—treating individuals with disabilities differently from other insureds—but this 
limitation does not require employers to provide any particular benefits, including mental health 
services. See supra notes 241–46 and accompanying text. A disability-based distinction is one based 
on a particular disability, a discrete group of disabilities, or disability in general. See id.; see also 
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 511 (2008). 
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12142–44, 12148, 12184 (2000). 
23. See, e.g., Liberty Res., Inc. v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 155 F. Supp. 2d 242, 244, 257–58 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001), vacated and appeal dismissed after compliance with court order, 54 F. App’x 769 (3d. 
Cir. 1992) (finding liability under Title II for a transportation authority that effectively split 
Paratransit rides between elderly and disabled riders). 
24. An interactive process is recommended by the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (2008). 
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ADA requires that a worker who discloses a disability and requests an 
accommodation receive only “a” reasonable accommodation to facilitate 
her functioning in the workplace.25 The accommodation might not be 
one that an individual prefers or that best promotes her functioning.26 
There is no requirement, for example, that accommodations support 
atypical modes of functioning.27 Further, accommodations are confined 
to the physical workspace or to modifications to the work day.28 
Accommodations do not include assistive devices that facilitate an 
individual’s employment by supporting her functioning both at home 
and at work. 
Fourth, many individuals with functional impairments have difficulty 
qualifying as disabled for civil rights protections.29 A significant portion 
                                                     
The process is adopted in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Dargis v. Sheahan, No. 05-2575, 2008 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 10526, at *19–20 (7th Cir. May 16, 2008) (holding that an interactive process is 
mandatory but not an independent cause of action); Buboltz v. Residential Advantages, Inc., No. 07-
2065, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8380, at *12 (8th Cir. Apr. 18, 2008) (holding that an interactive 
process is mandatory and failure to engage in such a process is evidence of bad faith); Freadman v. 
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Fire Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 104 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that an interactive 
process is mandatory); Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 2007) (same); 
Kleiber v. Honda, 485 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Dark v. Curry County, 451 F.3d 1078, 
1088 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 380 F.3d 751, 771–72 (3d Cir. 
2004) (holding that an interactive process is mandatory though not an independent cause of action; 
further holding that there is no liability if reasonable accommodation is not possible); Smith v. 
Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that an interactive process 
is mandatory); Kitchen v. Summers Continuous Care Ctr., LLC., No. 5:06-00022, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38419, at *15 (S.D. W. Va. May 12, 2008) (holding that an interactive process is mandatory 
but not an independent cause of action; further holding that there is no liability if reasonable 
accommodation is not possible). But see Sullivan v. Raytheon Co., 262 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(holding that an interactive process is not mandatory); Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, 
Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that use of an interactive process is subject 
to case-by-case assessment). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (2008). 
26. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (“The accommodation . . . does not have to be the ‘best’ 
accommodation possible, so long as it is sufficient to meet the job-related needs of the 
individual . . . . If more than one of these accommodations will enable the individual to perform the 
essential functions . . . the preference of the individual with a disability should be given primary 
consideration. However, the employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate discretion to 
choose between effective accommodations, and may choose the less expensive accommodation or 
the accommodation that is easier for it to provide.”). 
27. See Ani B. Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role of “Normal Species 
Functioning” in Disability Analysis, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 221, 225–58 (2006). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (discussing modifications to the physical workplace environment, job-
restructuring, and other workplace-specific alterations); see also Bagenstos, The Future of Disability 
Law, supra note 19, at 42. 
29. See, e.g., ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
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of the ninety-four percent of ADA plaintiffs who lose their cases at the 
federal district court level arguably cannot satisfy the disability threshold 
requirement.30 This difficulty stems from narrow judicial interpretation 
of the ADA in several areas31 as well as judicial confusion about the role 
of normal functioning in disability analysis.32 The recent ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (AAA)33 seeks to address these problems by 
broadening the disability threshold test and requiring that courts assess 
individuals for disability in a pre-mitigated state—that is, before the use 
of drugs, devices, or other measures to improve functioning34—rather 
than after the use of such ameliorative measures.35 The Amendments 
leave a number of issues unresolved, however. The U.S. Supreme Court 
often looks to outcomes rather than methods of functioning to determine 
disability—so if an individual functions atypically but effectively 
without legally recognized mitigating measures, she may not be 
                                                     
30. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100, 110–26, 133–37, 145–50, 153–56 (1999) (discussing the frequent use of 
summary judgment and the failure to defer to EEOC regulations that are favorable to establishing 
disability). This statistic does not account for the success of the ADA as measured by settlements 
and other informal arrangements. See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the 
ADA Work? 59 ALA. L. REV. 305 (2008). 
31. The U.S. Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the disability threshold test, that is, whether 
one is “substantially limited in a major life activity.” See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. 
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002) (finding that a factory worker who cannot perform “‘repetitive 
work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder level . . . for extended periods of time’” 
but who is able to complete a number of household tasks is not substantially limited in the major life 
activity of performing manual tasks under the ADA). 
The Court also reads restrictively both “substantial” and “major life activity.” In Toyota, the 
Court held that the test for whether a function is a major life activity is whether it is of “central 
importance to most people’s daily lives.” 534 U.S. at 197–98. An individual is “substantially 
limited” if she is “unable to perform . . . [or is] [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner, 
or duration under which [she] can perform a particular major life activity as compared to . . . the 
average person in the general population[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2008). In four of the last five 
major cases addressing the meaning of “substantial,” the Court found for the defendant. Compare 
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 184 (not “substantially limited” because the plaintiff is not “severely 
restrict[ed]”), and Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (not “substantially 
limited”), and Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (same), and Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (same), with Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) 
(“substantially limited”). 
32. Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction, supra note 27. 
33. The Act was signed into law on September 25, 2008, and will take effect January 1, 2009. 
AAA § 8.  
34.  Id. § 4(a). See infra note 125 for a list of mitigating measures.     
35. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471 (not disabled using eyeglasses); Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 
555 (not disabled when brain compensates for monocular vision); Murphy, 527 U.S. at 516 (not 
disabled when medicated for severe hypertension). 
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considered disabled.36 For example, an individual with severe carpal 
tunnel syndrome who completes office tasks may not be viewed as 
disabled, even though she works substantially longer hours than other 
employees to rest her hands periodically. Further, as addressed in Part II, 
the AAA does not address individuals who are vulnerable to disability 
given certain environmental changes, nor does it remedy the 
fragmentation of disability protections under the current civil rights 
approach. 
The limitations of the ADA prompted some commentators to suggest 
that a civil rights or an antidiscrimination approach to disability 
discrimination—an approach for which activists fought for twenty years 
prior to the enactment of the ADA—may not adequately address 
disability discrimination.37 Some critics advocate a social welfare model 
that ADA activists struggled to avoid, namely, a model focused on 
material supports for disabled individuals.38 A social welfare approach is 
based on compensation for disability, rather than social change to 
accommodate disability.39 It does not ground equality of participation as 
a formal right, though it does address the need for material resources 
such as wage, health, transportation, and other social supports. In other 
words, the social welfare approach focuses on eligibility for benefits 
rather than on antidiscrimination.40 This type of approach underlies 
Social Security disability benefits.41 
                                                     
36. See Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction, supra note 27, at 243–48. 
37. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1212–25 (2007) (appealing to a human rights paradigm); Bagenstos, The 
Future of Disability Law, supra note 19, at 54–70 (appealing to social welfare models); Diller, 
supra note 10, at 38–47 (noting limitations of the civil rights model). 
38. See, Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19, at 54–70; William G. Johnson, 
The Future of Disability Policy: Benefit Payments or Civil Rights? 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 160, 170–72 (1997); Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-
Integrationist Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 940–56 (2000). 
The tension between the social welfare and antidiscrimination models addressed in this Article is 
related to debates in other literatures, namely those between substantive and formal equality (actual 
equality versus sameness treatment), result and rule orientation (outcome versus procedural 
fairness), and distributive and formal justice (redistribution of material goods versus sameness 
treatment). 
39.  See ANITA SILVERS, DAVID WASSERMAN & MARY B. MAHOWALD, DISABILITY, 
DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES OF JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 74–76 
(1998). 
40. Johnson, supra note 38, at 161–63. 
41.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 705–08 (2000), is also viewed as embracing a social welfare approach to disability to the extent 
that the Act seeks to compensate the disabled worker through rehabilitation rather than altering the 
disabling environment. The Act is now “read through” ADA jurisprudence. See 29 C.F.R. § 
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While advocates of the social welfare model do not argue for the 
abandonment of the ADA, they suggest that disability discrimination 
cannot be addressed without focusing on the issue of lack of material 
supports.42 This premise both understates and overstates the problem. It 
overstates it in the sense that some of the pressing issues facing disabled 
persons—such as difficulty in qualifying for the protected class or 
receiving a preferred accommodation—are not addressed by material 
supports if disability protection, including accommodation, remains tied 
to protected class status. These issues must be addressed within the civil 
rights framework. It understates matters in the sense that access to some 
material supports, such as health care, is not a disability discrimination 
issue but one of general social welfare. 
This Article argues that reforming disability law requires a blend of 
the civil rights and social welfare models as informed by a novel lens: 
vulnerability as universal and constant. Part I interprets and applies for 
the first time to disability law Martha Fineman’s vulnerability thesis, 
which proffers this view of vulnerability. Fineman argues that 
vulnerability is part of the human experience, and the state must develop 
structures to address substantive inequality and disadvantage.43 Applying 
Fineman’s theory, I argue that vulnerability to disability and the 
vulnerabilities of disabled persons are universal and constant. All human 
beings are vulnerable to disability, and, when disabled, our 
vulnerabilities are often the basis for discrimination. These 
vulnerabilities are constant and exist across environments. 
Part II uses these insights to critique the current antidiscrimination 
approach to disability law reform. Section A discusses the limitations of 
viewing disability as an identity category rather than as a part of the 
human condition. In Section B, I develop a new concept that I term 
“fragmenting disability protection.” The current civil rights approach 
treats susceptibility to disability discrimination as situational or limited 
to a particular environment in the public realm instead of as extending 
                                                     
1614.203 (2008) (“The standards used to determine whether section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, as amended (29 U.S.C. 791), has been violated . . . shall be the standards applied under Titles 
I and V (sections 501 through 504 and 510) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as 
amended (42 U.S.C. 12101, 12111, 12201), as such sections relate to employment. These standards 
are set forth in the Commission’s ADA regulations at 29 CFR part 1630.”). 
42. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19, at 54–70; see also Samuel 
Bagenstos, Mend It, Don’t End It, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPIRICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Samuel Estreicher & Michael Ashley Stein, eds., forthcoming), permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n42.pdf. 
43. Nonhuman animals may, of course, also experience disability. 
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across environments in both the public and private spheres. 
Part III employs the concept of universal vulnerability to advocate a 
blend of the civil rights and social welfare models to address the current 
inequities in the legal and social responses to disability. To address 
barriers to unemployment and desired accommodations, Section A 
advocates the expansion of the reasonable accommodation mandate, 
supported by government subsidy. Individuals will receive 
accommodations that facilitate employment by enabling them to 
function across environments. This proposal entails a social welfare 
approach to accommodation but leaves in place the requirement of 
protected class status. Section B advocates the application of 
vulnerability theory to its fullest extent by arguing for a social welfare 
approach to health care to address universal vulnerability to illness. The 
differences in the approaches are based largely on practical 
considerations, and my position is in no way intended to discourage 
efforts to protect the vulnerability of workers who are not disabled. 
I. DISABILITY AND UNIVERSAL VULNERABILITY 
This Part discusses legal scholar Martha Fineman’s theory of 
vulnerability, namely that vulnerability is universal and constant.44 After 
interpreting her theory, I apply it for the first time in legal scholarship to 
disability. All individuals possess a universal vulnerability to disability, 
and disabled individuals have other universal vulnerabilities that they 
may experience more acutely, which are constant and extend across their 
home, work, and social environments. Fineman’s theory lends support to 
the concept I develop in Part II that the current approach to disability 
discrimination, which focuses on discrete environments rather than the 
experience of disability more generally, fragments disability protections. 
I argue in Part III that Fineman’s theory has implications for the civil 
rights model of disability as well as for social supports for disabled and 
nondisabled individuals; it informs the mixed civil rights and social 
welfare model I advocate in that Part. 
 
 
                                                     
44. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).  
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A.  Fineman’s Vulnerability Thesis 
Fineman’s theory of universal vulnerability has four premises: (1) 
vulnerability is universal and constant;45 (2) vulnerability is not situated 
in the body alone, that is, it may be the product of economic, 
institutional, and other social harm;46 (3) disadvantage (including 
discrimination)47 that results from vulnerability is best addressed by 
moving past identity categories,48 including protected classes;49 and (4) 
both state and private actors must address vulnerability.50 Fineman’s 
vulnerability thesis is a critique of formal equality, which provides the 
same opportunities to privileged and to disadvantaged groups as opposed 
to addressing substantive inequalities embedded within legal structures. 
Antidiscrimination mandates such as the ADA embrace formal equality. 
Fineman’s concept of vulnerability is that it is a “universal, inevitable, 
enduring aspect of the human condition.”51 All individuals are 
vulnerable, in the sense that they have the potential to become 
dependent.52 Her concept is similar to that used in international human 
rights instruments, which are framed in terms of shared vulnerabilities 
rather than specific deprivations and dependencies.53 In the human rights 
context, “vulnerability” is exposed by a “simultaneous increase in 
                                                     
45. Id. at 1. 
46. Id. at 9–10. 
47. Fineman prefers to speak in terms of “disadvantage” instead of “discrimination,” as she 
believes the former better captures the ills of privilege. Id. at 16. Further, “discrimination” invokes 
the protected class status of formal equality that she rejects as harmful to the very individuals it is 
designed to protect. Fineman acknowledges, however, that disadvantage may give rise to 
discrimination. Id. at 44 n.7 (“I acknowledge that discrimination does exist, and I do recognize that . 
. . personal characteristics might work to complicate the experience of vulnerability for any 
individual. My claim is merely that discrimination models based on identity characteristics will not 
produce circumstances of greater equality and may in fact lead to less in many circumstances.”) 
(emphasis added). 
48. Identity categories result from grouping individuals socially, culturally, or politically; gender, 
race, sexual orientation, religious affiliation, and disability may be viewed as identity categories. 
49. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 4. 
50. Id. at 19–22. 
51. Id. at 8. 
52. Id. at 12. 
53. See, e.g., Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, art. VIII, UNESCO G.C. 
Res., 33/24, U.N. Doc. C/Res/33/24 (Oct. 19, 2005), available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=1883&URL _DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION= 
201.html (discussing “human vulnerability”), permanent copy available at http:// 
www.law.washington.edu /wlr/notes/83washlrev513n53.pdf. 
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threats” and a “weakening of coping mechanisms.”54 This differs from 
the common use of “vulnerability” to describe the dependencies of 
particular groups or populations: individuals with malaria in Sub-
Saharan Africa, people institutionalized with mental illness, or persons 
of young or advanced age, for example.55 
Fineman eschews the “liberal subject”—who is viewed as a fully 
functioning adult56—and favors a “vulnerable subject,” who may have 
social, economic, or biological limitations.57 Every individual is 
constantly vulnerable to the possibility of impairment, though the 
ontology of their impairments may differ. State institutions are 
vulnerable to corruption, capture, and decline, according to Fineman, 
and the state must guard against this and respond when necessary.58 
The vulnerabilities of the liberal subject are currently addressed by 
our legal structures only in particular contexts. For example, laws protect 
certain disadvantaged groups from discrimination. Fineman argues that 
this context-specific approach not only limits the reach of protections for 
universal vulnerabilities, it also fails to address existing inequalities 
embedded within legal and social structures, such as wage disparities 
and stigma.59 Further, current laws are framed with reference to a subject 
whose vulnerabilities, due to existing social supports or serendipity, 
never manifest themselves as dependencies.60 Those who require 
additional health care, wage supports, or environmental adaptations to 
function are disadvantaged by a system that views their needs as 
exceptional (requiring something akin to affirmative action),61 rather 
                                                     
54. Peader Kirby, Roundtable Discussion with Bryan S. Turner & Peadar Kirby, Vulnerable 
Populations Speaker Series, Emory University School of Law (Apr. 17, 2008); see also PEADAR 
KIRBY, VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ch. 3 (2006) (discussing 
the evolution of the term “vulnerability” in the international context). 
55. Fineman makes a similar point. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 8. 
56. The concept of the liberal subject is informed by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, which 
separates the individual from the external world (the subject/object distinction). Rawls famously 
describes the liberal subject at an original or neutral position, unaware of her social lot in life. JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19–21 (1971). Rawl’s subject is “[a] normally active and fully 
cooperating member[] of society over a complete life,” or perceived as healthy over a lifetime. John 
Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 159, 168 (Amartya Sen 
& Bernard Williams eds., 1982). 
57. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 11–12. 
58. Id. at 12–13. Fineman questions, for example, the robust legal structures that further corporate 
practice and distribute wealth to few. Id. at 20–22. 
59. Id. at 15–18. 
60. Id. at 15–16. 
61. See, e.g., James Leonard, The Equality Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights 
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than as a manifestation of the human condition.62 The current legal 
scheme results in double jeopardy for some: individuals are 
disadvantaged by the realization of certain vulnerabilities, and they are 
consequently denied or provided limited assistance because their needs 
are viewed as exceptional.63 
Fineman’s response to the vulnerable subject and the vulnerable state 
is to move past formal equality and identity categories toward a strong 
state with structures that support vulnerabilities as universal.64 She views 
the state as obligated to develop structures from which every person will 
benefit.65 She provides, by way of example, the Common Benefits 
Clause of the Vermont Constitution, which was enacted prior to the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.66 The 
Common Benefits Clause states that the role of the government is “for 
the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or 
community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any 
single person, family, or set of persons.”67 This provision was used by 
the Supreme Court of Vermont to extend the legal benefits enjoyed by 
opposite-sex married couples to same-sex couples.68 Individuals in 
Vermont are entitled to the benefits because they are citizens of the state, 
not because they are part of a protected class as we commonly 
understand it.69 
Fineman’s arguments for framing state responsibility significantly 
advance academic discourse about government response to 
disadvantage, including discrimination. Fineman’s focus on vulnerability 
as universal and constant redefines the relationship between the state and 
the individual. The state’s role is expanded beyond addressing specific 
dependencies of some protected groups to responding to the 
                                                     
Concepts has Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 43 (2005). 
62. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 17–18. 
 63. See, e.g., Ani B. Satz, The Limits of Health Care Reform, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1451, 1483 (2008) 
(discussing the double jeopardy of individuals with poor health status or in advanced age who are 
disadvantaged by rationing schemes); see also infra note 251 and accompanying text. 
64.  Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 19–22. Fineman argues that 
“[v]ulnerability . . . freed from its limited and negative associations is a powerful conceptual tool 
with the potential to define an obligation for the state to ensure a richer and more robust guarantee 
of equality than is currently afforded under the equal protection model.” Id. at 8–9. 
65. Id. at 19. 
66. Id. at 22. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 22–23. 
69. Id. at 23. 
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vulnerability of every individual regardless of whether financial, social, 
or physical impairments rise to dependency. The role of the state and its 
institutions is to provide resilience to vulnerable individuals.70 When 
legal and social institutions are structured to address universal 
vulnerability, the citizen and the state have a tighter, continuous, and 
evolving relationship. 
Thus, Fineman’s vulnerability thesis bears directly on the 
public/private distinction, or the question of when and under what 
constraints the state may act. The state regulates only what is deemed to 
be public, such as markets and some aspects of civic life.71 When it 
comes to addressing vulnerability, the state is currently assumed to be 
non-interventionist. State intervention to address impairments to 
functioning outside the marketplace is considered an intrusion into the 
private realm. Fineman’s view of vulnerability as universal and constant 
illuminates the difficulty with this distinction, namely, that vulnerability 
does not end when one leaves the public realm (or particular parts of the 
public arena). 
Fineman envisions the state reasserting itself to address universal 
vulnerabilities as well as the dependencies of those whose vulnerabilities 
are realized. She argues that the law should move past identity categories 
and antidiscrimination mandates toward addressing shared, constant 
vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities may be biological, social, or 
economic, and require social supports. 
B.  Universal Vulnerabilities to Disability and for Disabled Persons 
This Part situates Fineman’s vulnerability theory within the existing 
antidiscrimination critique and applies it to disability. Unlike previous 
commentators, Fineman stresses the need for an interventionist state to 
address universal vulnerability. Fineman moves beyond focusing on the 
vulnerabilities of target groups and removes private firms as gatekeepers 
of accommodation. Her vulnerability thesis applies to vulnerability to 
disability as well as to individuals with realized vulnerabilities that result 
in disability. Disabled individuals may have heightened vulnerabilities 
associated with their impairments and be disadvantaged by 
discrimination on the basis of those vulnerabilities. 
                                                     
70. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 13 (citing PEADAR KIRBY, 
VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE (2006)). 
71. MARTHA ALBERSTON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 38–39, 
208 (2004). 
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1.  Situating Vulnerability Theory Within Existing Antidiscrimination 
Critique 
Before applying Fineman’s vulnerability thesis to disability, it is 
necessary to place her theory within the existing critique of the civil 
rights approach to disability discrimination. Fineman does not address 
disability directly. Rather, she provides a more general critique of the 
formal equality or antidiscrimination approach to human vulnerability.72 
Fineman is critical of a formal equality approach, which focuses on 
equal treatment, on three grounds. First, sameness treatment does not 
consider or address structural inequalities; people are treated in a like 
manner under existing laws and practices that entrench inequalities.73 
Second, formal equality results in a “withering state,”74 as corporate and 
other private interests limit the role and ability of the government to 
address inequalities.75 As Fineman states, under the formal equality 
paradigm “the state minimally supervises . . . institutions in fulfilling 
their essential role in providing assets that give us resilience in the face 
of vulnerability.”76 Third, formal equality excludes those with 
vulnerabilities who are not part of a protected class.77 Additionally, 
Fineman cautions that expanding the protected class may serve as “a 
justification for abandoning the pursuit of substantive equality,” or 
addressing the structural issues contributing to disadvantage.78 While 
this is an empirical claim, it underscores the possible dangers of 
addressing disability discrimination by sameness treatment. 
Disability scholarship discussing the inherent limitations of the civil 
rights approach identifies similar issues, though not necessarily in 
Fineman’s terms. Formal equality for disabled individuals under the 
ADA means being treated like individuals who do not have a 
disability.79 While this may involve accommodation, scholars and 
                                                     
72. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 2. 
73. Id. at 3. 
74. Fineman defines the “state” as “an organized and official set of linked institutions that 
together hold coercive power, including the ability to make and enforce mandatory legal rules, and 
which is legitimated by claim to public authority. In form the ‘state’ could be locally, nationally, 
transnationally, or internationally organized.”). Id. at 6 n.14. 
75. Id. at 5–6. 
76. Id. at 19. 
77. Id. at 3, 5. 
78. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 20. 
79. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 61, at 45–46; Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra 
note 19, at 37 (speaking of an “access/content distinction”: disabled individuals have access to the 
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activists recognize that formal equality does not address the structural 
inequities that limit disabled individuals in work and civic life.80 
Further, commentators acknowledge the “withering state” in a narrow 
sense, namely, the ADA and its supporting regulations limit the federal 
government’s role in promoting equality because the reasonable 
accommodation provision is interpreted as an antidiscrimination 
mandate.81 There is little to no federal funding of accommodations,82 and 
the federal government generally does not interfere with the 
accommodations made by state and local governments or private parties 
so long as they are reasonable.83 
Scholarship focused on extending the protected class and the AAA 
purport to address the arguments contained within Fineman’s last 
critique: the exclusion of those with vulnerabilities from legal 
protections.84 As I argue in Part II.A, however, expanding the protected 
class cannot resolve some of the limitations of the identity category 
approach to addressing discrimination. Individuals with vulnerabilities 
from impairments that do not rise to the level of disabilities will remain 
unprotected. 
                                                     
same benefits as individuals who are not disabled, though the content of the benefit is not altered to 
meet the needs of disabled individuals). 
80. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19, at 42–50; Michael Ashley 
Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 75, 92–93 (2007). 
81. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. 
L. REV. 1, 43 (2006); Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference, supra note 9, at 637–40; Stein & 
Stein, supra note 37, at 1210–11.  
82. See infra note 216 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. State sovereign immunity may be abrogated 
when states fail to make disability accommodations that support basic constitutional rights. See 
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (holding that Title II abrogates state sovereign 
immunity when conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 
(2004) (holding that Title II abrogates state sovereign immunity with respect to the fundamental 
right of access to courts). 
84.  See, e.g., Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the 
ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 373-74 (2000); Cheryl L. Anderson, 
“Deserving Disabilities”: Why the Definition of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act Should Be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83 
(2000); Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of 
the “Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405 
(1999). Michael Stein’s scholarship regarding disability as a human right is a notable exception, as 
he acknowledges that the “group classified as ‘disabled’ often overlaps significantly with other 
socially marginalized groups . . . . This connection underscores the universality of disability, both as 
a human rights issue and as part of the human experience.” Stein & Stein, supra note 37, at 1240. 
Stein refers to the universality of disability, whereas Fineman is concerned with vulnerability. 
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2.  Applying Fineman’s Vulnerability Theory to Disability 
Fineman’s theory has clear applications to the disability context, both 
in terms of thinking about the disabled subject and the state’s response to 
vulnerability to impairment. To begin, a vulnerable subject may become 
a disabled subject. Vulnerability to disability (and other impairments) is 
universal and constant; we are all one curb step away from disability.85 
We are susceptible to disability as part of the human condition. 
An individual becomes disabled when certain vulnerabilities are 
realized. A disabled individual remains vulnerable to further disability 
and may experience particular vulnerabilities more acutely: 
“[u]ndeniably universal, human vulnerability is . . . particular [and] is 
experienced uniquely by each of us . . . .”86 Thus, the vulnerable subject 
differs from the dominant conception of a liberal subject, who is viewed 
as a normal, fully functioning adult.87 The vulnerable subject exists at 
various life stages and with a spectrum of possible abilities, including 
impairments to functioning.88 
Fineman’s conception of the vulnerable subject reveals that the 
current approach to disability discrimination based on protected class 
membership ignores the possible shared benefits of facilitating a variety 
of means of functioning. The ADA focuses on independence rather than 
dependence or interdependence (shared dependence) of individuals.89 
                                                     
85. I borrow this expression from a conversation with Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Professor of 
Women’s Studies, Emory University. 
86. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 10. 
 87. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.   
88. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The concept of the vulnerable subject overcomes a 
limitation in Martha Nussbaum’s work addressing obligations to disabled persons. Under 
Nussbaum’s capabilities model, disabled individuals with profound impairments may not be able to 
realize the capabilities she suggests a state must maximize for each individual to promote human 
dignity. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE 76–78, 179–81, 192–93 (2006); see also 
Stein, Disability Human Rights, supra note 80, at 105 (discussing this limitation of Nussbaum’s 
theory). 
89. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)–(9) (2000) (stressing the need to eliminate dependency and 
to promote independent living); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing Before 
H. Subcomm. on Public Works and Transport., 101st Cong. 13, 14 (1989) (statement of Roland 
Moss); id. at 89 (statement of David M. Capozzi); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 8 (1989) (statement of Hon. Steve 
Bartlett); id. at 44–47, 51 (statement of Judith Comfort); id. at 47, 61–63 (statement of Robert 
Mosbacher); id. at 96–98 (statement of Dr. William A. Spencer); id. at 133, 149 (statement of Kathy 
Wingen); id. at 278–79, 284 (statement of Oral O. Miller); id. at 504, 507, 510 (statement of Robert 
M. Werth). The ADA of 1990 is based on a publication of the National Council of the Handicapped. 
See TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES—WITH LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS (1986). 
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The reason for this may be the ADA’s concentration on an 
independence–(inter)dependence rather than a vulnerability–resilience 
dichotomy. While some commentators in disability studies view 
interdependence as a beneficial way to view the implications of 
disability,90 others view it as potentially harmful to speak of disability in 
terms of interdependence, as it may invoke pity and other negative 
sentiments.91 Focusing on shared vulnerability and resilience advances 
the discussion. 
Appealing to universal vulnerabilities removes the stigma of needing 
assistance and improves protections for all, eliminating backlash by 
those who would otherwise fail to receive protections. In contexts such 
as health care and employment, it may not make sense to speak of a 
protected class.92 Consider the similar vulnerabilities of disabled, 
minority, and at-will employees, in terms of heightened vulnerability to 
termination and barriers to re-entering the workforce.93 An even stronger 
analogy may be made between individuals with impairments that do not 
rise to the level of disability and the vulnerabilities of individuals in 
these other categories. As Matthew Diller notes, “[I]f the plaintiffs’ 
impairments do not appear serious enough, then there is no basis for 
distinguishing them from the general mass of workers who are subject to 
the vicissitudes of at-will employment and [for] grant[ing] [plaintiffs] 
the ‘benefit’ of accommodation and protection from discharge.”94 
Similar arguments may be made in the health care context, as everyone 
benefits from broad, affordable coverage, given universal vulnerability 
to illness and other impairments requiring medical attention. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, Fineman argues for a strong state 
to address universal vulnerabilities. This view sheds light on a current 
limitation of disability scholarship: disability literature focuses much 
attention on the role of the employer, but not the state, in addressing the 
vulnerabilities of disabled workers.95 The impact of the state is assumed 
                                                     
90. See, e.g., SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 
ON DISABILITY 145 (1996). 
91.  See, e.g., SILVERS, WASSERMAN & MAHOWALD, supra note 39, at 103. 
92. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44, at 14 (arguing that her theory of universal 
vulnerability applies to education, health, and employment systems). 
93. Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 10, at 47 (“If differential and individualized treatment 
[under the reasonable accommodation mandate] is necessary for the establishment of equal 
opportunity for people with disabilities, it may also be necessary for other groups.”). 
94. Id. at 49–50. 
95. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19, at 43–44, 47. 
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as a constant, and immense pressure is applied to employers to address 
structural inequalities affecting disabled employees.96 
This approach seems both a Sisyphean effort and an unjust request. It 
is Sisyphean because employers are asked to change their practices 
within a system that privileges employers in terms of influence on 
workplace practices and wealth. It may be, as Catherine Albiston and 
others argue, that small alterations from the ground up in employment 
will address some (local) structural inequalities for disabled workers, but 
this seems unlikely to bring about effective, systemic change.97 Further, 
it may be unjust, as some conscientious employers may bear an immense 
burden to address structural inequalities, while others gain economically 
from not improving practices. If the state restructures its legal 
institutions to consider adequately the universal vulnerabilities of 
disabled employees, employers will share the same obligations. A top-
down approach also affords uniformity in practice. 
While Fineman’s theory seeks to present an alternative to an 
antidiscrimination approach such as the ADA, it provides insights about 
how a civil rights model might be improved. Fineman’s 
conceptualization of vulnerability supports the argument that it does not 
make sense to view the vulnerabilities associated with disability as 
arising within discrete environments under any paradigm. Vulnerability 
does not end when one leaves a movie theater, a workplace, or a 
commuter train; vulnerability based on impairments to functioning is 
universal and constant. Part II examines the limits of the current 
antidiscrimination approach to disability, focusing on the requirement of 
protected class membership and the fragmentation of disability 
protections by a civil rights approach that views vulnerability as 
situational. 
II. THE LIMITS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
This Part discusses the limitations of the current civil rights approach 
to disability discrimination in terms of reliance on disability as an 
                                                     
96. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 81, at 4 (“The challenge for civil rights 
advocates, then, is not to devise new doctrines so much as it is to convince judges and the broader 
political community that employers should be held responsible for structural problems of workplace 
inequality when they are not taking sufficient steps to counteract those problems.”). 
97. Catherine R. Albiston, The Institutional Context of Civil Rights, Remarks at the Annual 
Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Montreal, Canada (May 30, 2008) (discussing a 
forthcoming monograph); see also Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 81, at 4. 
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identity category and the fragmentation of disability protections. Identity 
categories result from grouping individuals socially, culturally, or 
politically. The ADA recognizes disabled persons as part of a protected 
class rather than viewing disability as an aspect of the human 
experience.98 Thus, as in the gender, race, and religion contexts, 
protections for disabled individuals against discrimination are contingent 
upon protected class membership. 
The concept of fragmenting disability protections is a novel critique 
of antidiscrimination law. Protections for class members are fragmented 
when the vulnerabilities associated with disability are viewed as arising 
within discrete environments—such as the workplace, the local shopping 
mall, or the public library—rather than existing continuously across 
environments. Conceptualizing the experience of disability as 
fragmented, rather than as constant and part of the human condition, is 
perhaps the most significant barrier to addressing disability 
discrimination under the current civil rights approach. 
This Part adds to the existing critique of the antidiscrimination 
approach to disability law in two ways. First, I demonstrate that the 
limitations of class membership for disabled individuals are inherent 
constraints of the civil rights approach, rather than an issue of 
implementation of the ADA. Many scholars,99 and indeed the authors 
and supporters of the AAA,100 suggest that construing the definition of 
disability to include more persons with impairments will substantially 
address the barriers to disability protection. I recognize identity 
categories as a limitation of the civil rights approach that cannot be 
remedied by judicial or legislative adjustments to the ADA. However 
broadly the protected class is defined, it will necessarily exclude 
individuals with impairments that do not meet the disability threshold 
test. Restricted membership in the protected class suggests that disability 
law reform requires a mixed social and civil rights approach to address 
                                                     
98. The AAA, however, strikes 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7), which states in part that “individuals 
with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008). See also infra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
99. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving Disabilities”: Why the Definition of Disability 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should Be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial 
Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83 (2000); Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability 
Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It? 
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition 
of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321 (2000). 
100. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. E1376 (daily ed. June 26, 2008) (statement of Rep. Capps) (co-
sponsor); 154 CONG. REC. H6083-84 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). 
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the vulnerabilities associated with some biological impairments. 
Second, I develop the concept of fragmenting disability protections as 
a critique of the current civil rights approach. The ADA assumes that the 
vulnerabilities associated with biological impairments may be addressed 
within particular environments in the public realm, such as the 
workplace,101 transportation,102 and places of public accommodation,103 
thus failing to account for the vulnerabilities of disabled individuals 
while moving between and outside these environments. Viewing 
vulnerability as situational results in interrupted protections on two 
fronts. To start, accommodations within the public realm are limited to 
discrete contexts. Take a simple illustration: under current ADA case 
law, a Deaf person must be able to enter a movie theater,104 but there is 
no requirement that she be able to view a film with captioning.105 
Further, accommodations within the private realm that facilitate entry 
into the public domain are not addressed by the ADA. For example, the 
Act does not speak to accommodations at home that are necessary for an 
employee to complete vital personal tasks necessary to maintain a 
routine work schedule, such as personal grooming, laundry, and meal 
preparation. 
Fragmented protections do not adequately respond to the 
vulnerabilities associated with disability. Disabled citizens may be 
directly denied meaningful access to services in the public realm, as in 
the theater example. Disabled individuals may also be indirectly denied 
access to opportunities in the public realm when they lack 
accommodations in the private sphere that facilitate entry into the public 
domain, such as into the workforce. Viewing vulnerability as situational 
also makes it difficult to identify and to address structural inequalities 
such as wage inequities and stigma. This is because these inequities 
involve social discrimination that is not bounded by the contexts upon 
                                                     
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
102. Id. §§ 12142–44, 12148, 12182(b)(2)(B), 12184. 
103. Id. §§ 12181–89. 
104. Id. § 12181(7)(C) (covering “motion picture house”). 
105. See, e.g., Todd v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., No. H-02-1944, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25317, at 
*13–15 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2003) (holding that installing closed captioning, which is viewable only 
to those who choose it, poses an undue burden on defendant theaters); Cornilles v. Regal Cinemas, 
Inc., No. 00-173-AS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7025, at *15–22 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2002) (holding that 
there is no obligation under the regulations to provide either closed captioning or open captioning, 
which is visible to all in a theater). But see Ball v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 120, 126–32 
(D.D.C. 2003) (approving a joint motion for settlement providing closed captioning). 
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which the law focuses. Stigma against disabled workers, for example, 
usually does not originate within the place of employment but travels 
into the work environment from familial or social contexts. 
A. Disability as an Identity Category 
Much is written in critical legal scholarship about the value of identity 
categories and their relation to legal rights.106 I do not in this brief 
Section intend to take a position in the debate about whether identity 
categories—groups of individuals based on social, cultural, or political 
affiliation—promote or hinder rights overall. My argument is simple: 
The civil rights approach to disability discrimination is inherently 
limited because it requires viewing disability as an identity category. 
The requirement of class membership necessarily excludes some 
individuals with impairments from disability protections. Thus, while 
expanding the definition of disability with the AAA or through judicial 
construction may protect more individuals with disabilities, it does not 
adequately address the vulnerabilities of individuals outside the 
protected class. These individuals must turn to other legal structures to 
address their vulnerabilities. 
At a basic level, a civil rights approach requires creating a protected 
class of individuals. Prior to the AAA, disabled individuals were 
considered part of a “discrete and insular minority”107 as members of 
protected classes are viewed in the race, religion, and national origin 
contexts.108 The source of discrimination (impairments, for disabled 
persons) had to be immutable109 or consist of “characteristics that are 
beyond [the individual’s] control.”110 While the AAA strikes this 
language,111 it retains the disability threshold test for class membership 
requiring that an individual be “substantially limit[ed]” in “one or more 
major life activities,” have “a record of such an impairment,” or “be[] 
                                                     
106. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER (2004); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: 
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1999); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE 
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY 
FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1997); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, 
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). 
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). 
108. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
109. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
110. 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(7). 
111. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008). 
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regarded as having such an impairment.”112  
Thus, disabled individuals bear a unique burden under the civil rights 
paradigm, in the sense that they must prove that they qualify for 
membership in the protected class. The U.S. Supreme Court limited 
class membership by imposing strict tests for “substantially”113 and 
“major life activities”114 as well as assessing individuals for disability 
after they employed drugs and devices that mitigated the effects of 
impairment.115 Individuals “regarded as” disabled also had to show that 
their perceived disability, if actual, would substantially limit a major life 
activity. 
The AAA makes clear that the disability threshold test is not meant to 
be overly restrictive. Given the recent nature of the amendments, it is 
worth describing their effect on class membership in some detail. The 
Rules of Construction state that “[t]he definition of disability in this Act 
shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this 
Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.”116 The 
AAA further states that “the primary object of attention in cases brought 
under the ADA should be whether entities . . . have complied with their 
obligations,” and it cautions that the question of “whether an 
individual’s impairment is a disability . . . should not demand extensive 
analysis.”117 The AAA also strikes the language in the preamble to the 
ADA that “some 43,000,000 million Americans have one or more 
physical or mental disabilities”118 (cited in the 1990 Supreme Court 
trilogy narrowly interpreting the disability threshold test).119  
 
                                                     
112. Id. § 4. 
113.  Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (“substantially” is to 
be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled”). 
114. Id. at 198 (an impairment “must . . . prevent[] or severely restrict[] the individual from doing 
activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives”). 
115.  See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481–89 (1999) (not disabled using 
eyeglasses); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (not disabled when 
medicated for severe hypertension); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) 
(not disabled when brain compensates for monocular vision). 
116. AAA § 4(a). 
117. Id. § 2(b)(5). 
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008); AAA § 3.  
119. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488–89 (holding that twin sisters with severe myopia are not disabled); 
Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521 (holding that a mechanic who manages his severe hypertension with drugs 
is not disabled); Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565–66 (holding that a truck driver with monocular vision 
is not disabled). 
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Specifically, the AAA: 
• Requires a court to assess an individual for class membership in 
an unmitigated state,120 
• Appeals to the EEOC to develop a broader reading of 
“substantially” in light of its Rules of Construction,121 
• Broadens the scope of “major life activity,”122 and 
• Reverts to a broader reading of “regarded as disabled.”123 
Perhaps the most fundamental change to class membership is that an 
individual is assessed in an unmitigated state prior to using drugs, 
devices, or other tools to promote functioning.124 The AAA provides an 
extensive, nonexclusive list of ameliorative measures that are not to be 
considered when assessing an individual for class membership.125 An 
exception is made for individuals using “ordinary eyeglasses or contact 
lenses.”126 These individuals are to be assessed after their vision is 
corrected; employers may terminate them for failing to meet vision 
acuity requirements only if such qualifications are “job-related” and 
“consistent with business necessity.”127 
                                                     
120. AAA §§ 2(b)(2), 4(a). 
121.  Id. §§ 2(b)(4)–(6). 
122.  Id. §§ 2(b)(4), 4(a). 
123. Id. § 2(b)(3) (returning to the standard articulated in Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 
480 U.S. 273, 282–86 (1987)). 
124.  This is consistent with the original EEOC regulations, which were disregarded by the Court 
in its 1990 trilogy of cases. The Court argued that the EEOC did not have authority to issue 
regulations with regard to the definition of disability, which is located in the introductory material to 
the ADA and outside its titles. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479. While the AAA specifically grants rule-
making authority to the EEOC with regard to the definition of disability, it fails to discuss deference 
to agency regulations. See AAA § 6(a)(2).  
125. “Mitigating measures” include:  
(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-vision devices (which do not 
include ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing 
aids, and cochlear implants or other implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, or oxygen 
therapy equipment and supplies; (II) use of assistive technology; (III) reasonable 
accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or learned behavioral or adaptive neurological 
modifications.  
AAA § 4(a). “Auxiliary aids and services” are defined as  
(A) qualified interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials 
available to individuals with hearing impairments; (B) qualified readers, taped texts, or other 
effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals with visual 
impairments; (C) acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; (D) and other similar 
services and actions. 
Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. § 5(b). 
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The AAA also seeks to expand the protected class by articulating a 
more liberal reading of “substantial” and “major life activity.” The Act 
explicitly rejects the standard put forth in Toyota Motor Manufacturing 
of Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,128 that an individual must be “severely 
restrict[ed] . . . from doing activities that are of central importance to 
most people’s daily lives.”129 While the AAA leaves the task of 
reinterpreting “substantially” to the EEOC,130 it demonstrates by way of 
example how broadly major life activities are to be interpreted; it 
provides an extensive list of relevant activities, including “working” and 
“major bodily functions.”131 Further, the AAA includes episodic or in-
remission impairments that would qualify as disabilities when active.132 
This covers a large number of conditions that previously encountered 
mixed judicial treatment, such as epilepsy, cancer, and multiple 
sclerosis.133 In addition, the Act clarifies that an individual need be 
impaired in only one major life activity.134 
With respect to individuals who are “regarded as disabled,” 
individuals meet the Act’s threshold test even if they cannot show that if 
they actually had the condition at issue, they would be impaired in a 
major life activity.135 In addition, the AAA alters the meaning of a 
                                                     
128. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
129.  AAA § 2(b)(4) (citing Toyota Motor Mfg. of Ky., Inc. v. Williams 534 U.S. 184, 198 
(2002)). 
130. Id. § 2(b)(4). 
131. The AAA states that: 
[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual 
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, 
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working . . . . [A] major life 
activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, 
functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, 
brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.  
Id.  
132. Id. 
133.  See infra note 162 and accompanying text (epilepsy). Compare Demming v. Hous. & 
Redev. Auth., 66 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 1995) (woman with thyroid cancer not disabled under 
Rehabilitation Act), and Dinsdale v. Wesley, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12015, at *13 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 
13, 2000) (woman with colon cancer not disabled under ADA after chemotherapy ended), and 
Farmer v. Nat’l City Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20941, at *16-17 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 1996) (man 
treated for prostate cancer with lingering incontinence and impotence not disabled under ADA), 
with EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 823 F. Supp. 571, 572 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1993), rev’d in part 
on other grounds, 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (man with terminal cancer disabled under ADA). 
134. AAA § 4(a). 
135.  Id. The AAA returns to the broad standard articulated in School Board of Nassau County v. 
Arline, a case interpreting the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 705-08 (1998): 
“those who are regarded as impaired . . . are substantially limited in a major life activity.” 480 U.S. 
273, 284 (1987); see also AAA § 2(b)(3). 
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“qualified individual with a disability” from one discriminated against 
“because of . . . disability” to one who experiences discrimination “on 
the basis of disability.”136 Arguably this change more clearly 
encapsulates “regarded as” discrimination. Strengthening the “regarded 
as” prong is significant, as it demonstrates in a limited context that 
Congress recognizes the importance of treating vulnerability to 
impairment (in the sense of disadvantageous treatment) as universal; that 
is, both disabled and nondisabled individuals may experience the same 
discrimination. 
While these changes greatly enhance the ability of individuals to 
qualify as disabled, some people with impairments are left unprotected. 
For example, individuals who are functional in their current 
environments but hyper-vulnerable to impairment by environmental 
alteration are not protected, unless they have a qualifying episodic 
disability or one that is in remission.137 A disabled individual is hyper-
vulnerable to changes in her environment when she requires certain 
environmental supports to function, such as a break room with a 
refrigerator in which to store medicine or special meals, a quiet and 
unpopulated workspace, or a smoke-free common area in her place of 
residence. It is only after an environmental change—such as an 
employer turning a break room into a gym and an employee becoming 
unable to function in her workplace—that an individual may be eligible 
for disability protection. Individuals who are mildly symptomatic or 
asymptomatic for disabling illnesses that they have not previously 
experienced also are not classified as disabled under the AAA.138 
                                                     
136. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (defining “qualified individual with a disability”); AAA § 5. 
The perceived impairment must be one that would last at least six months, however, if it actually 
manifest. Id. § 4(a). 
137. AAA § 4(a) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would 
substantially limit a major life activity when active.”). 
138. Further, it is doubtful courts would construe the AAA to cover these individuals as 
“substantially limited” in a major life activity. Prior to the AAA, they were not viewed as such. See, 
e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg. of Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201–03 (2002) (individual with 
carpal tunnel syndrome who is largely functional with regard to manual tasks at home is not 
disabled); McGuinness v. Univ. N.M. Sch. Med., 170 F.3d 974, 978 (1998) (student whose “anxiety 
impairs his ‘academic functioning,’ not his ability to work” fails the disability threshold test).  
 The relevant “physical or mental impairment” continues to be understood as a condition that is 
manifest or was previously present. See AAA § 4(a). There are two exceptions, however. 
“Asymptomatic” AIDS was recognized by the Court as a “physical impairment” because of “the 
immediacy with which the virus begins to damage the infected person’s white blood cells and the 
severity of the disease.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 635–37 (1998). The Court noted, 
however, that “asymptomatic” in this context is a “misnomer . . . for clinical features persist 
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Further, membership in the protected class is not sufficient to 
establish a claim to a remedy. While the Court seems to combine under 
the disability threshold test the question of whether an individual is 
disabled with the inquiry about whether she is entitled to a remedy, these 
are conceptually distinct inquiries.139 After the AAA, it is possible that 
the Court will more clearly separate these questions. The AAA in fact 
makes explicit that employers are not required to provide 
accommodations to employees who are “regarded as” disabled,140 such 
as accommodations for impairments that do not rise to the level of 
disability141 or workplace sensitivity training. More generally, however, 
by including greater numbers of individuals in the protected class, the 
AAA will likely focus more attention on whether accommodations 
impose an “undue hardship” on an employer.142 In other words, 
protected class membership may no longer serve as the gatekeeper 
doctrine for accommodating disability; expanding class membership 
may mean that protected class status cannot be equated with a remedy, 
even in the narrow situational sense discussed below in Subpart B. 
In sum, an antidiscrimination approach to disability necessarily 
excludes some individuals with impairments. Further, class membership 
does not guarantee a remedy. In Part III, I address the question of how 
the state should respond to vulnerability outside the protected class. 
While the AAA addresses some of the discrete issues with respect to the 
implementation of the ADA, it falls short in two regards. First, the 
protected class is not expanded to include individuals who are 
asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic for disability (that is, they will 
                                                     
throughout, including lymphadenopathy, dermatological disorders, oral lesions, and bacterial 
infections.” Id. at 635. Individuals with predispositions to genetic conditions are now protected 
under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881, 
922 (2008). 
139. Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction, supra note 27, at 248–50. 
140. AAA § 6(a)(1). Presumably, discriminatory behavior will be halted and the usual damages 
will apply, however. 
141. See, e.g., D’Angelo v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1228–40 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that an individual with vertigo not limited in the major life activity of working may be 
entitled to accommodation if “regarded as” disabled); Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that an individual who is not disabled but “regarded as” disabled may be 
entitled to an accommodation of bringing supplemental oxygen to work). 
142. “Undue hardship” is an affirmative defense under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) 
(2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
The statute defines it as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense,” based on factors 
including the cost, the overall resources of the employer or those of its facility or facilities making 
the accommodation, and the impact on that employer or facility or facilities. Id. § 12111(10). 
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develop disability in the future), or who will be easily disabled by 
(hyper-vulnerable to) changes in their environments. Second, as I argue 
in the next Subpart, the scope of protections for class members may be 
limited by a situational view of the vulnerabilities associated with 
disability discrimination. 
B. Disability Law as Fragmenting Disability Protection 
This Section presents a new critique of the antidiscrimination 
approach to disability discrimination based on what I term “fragmenting 
disability protection,” or treating vulnerabilities associated with 
impairments as if they arise in discrete environments, such as the 
workplace or particular places of public accommodation. This approach 
to vulnerability, a function of reasonable accommodation being an 
unfunded mandate,143 may be the most significant limitation of a civil 
rights approach to disability protection. Generally speaking, it results in 
a patchwork of protections that do not coalesce to allow meaningful 
social participation. More specifically, viewing vulnerabilities as 
situational creates the false perception that individuals with significant 
impairments are not disabled in some environments. In addition, a 
situational approach to vulnerability disregards the benefits of 
conceptualizing vulnerability as universal for disabled and nondisabled 
individuals alike. 
1.  Disability and Vulnerability to Discrimination 
When our vulnerabilities result in disability, we may become subject 
to discrimination.144 As recognized in the original preamble to the ADA, 
stereotypical views about disability historically subjected disabled 
individuals to “purposeful unequal treatment” and to “political 
powerlessness.”145 Disabled individuals experience discrimination based 
                                                     
143. I am grateful to Emory Law Professor Charlie Shanor for his insights on this issue. 
144. See, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)–(6), which states that: 
Congress finds that . . . individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of 
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of 
architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, 
failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification 
standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, 
benefits, jobs, or other opportunities . . . people with disabilities . . . occupy an inferior status in 
our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and 
educationally. 
145. Id. § 12101(a)(7). 
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on stereotypes about their abilities146 as well as social environments that 
privilege dominant ways of functioning.147 The AAA states that “people 
with . . . disabilities are frequently precluded from [fully participating in 
society] because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to 
remove societal and institutional barriers.”148 
One approach to addressing disability discrimination is to consider 
the vulnerability of individuals meeting the threshold test in a series of 
key environments, or to offer fragmented legal protection. This view 
treats vulnerability as attached to a location or function rather than as 
inherent in the individual. Individuals are understood to move in and out 
of vulnerability as opposed to vulnerability being a constant part of the 
human experience. 
Another approach is to address the vulnerability associated with 
biological impairments more broadly through our legal and social 
structures, recognizing that vulnerability is located within individuals 
and therefore exists across environments. Vulnerability is part of the 
human condition, meaning that all individuals are vulnerable.149 
Individuals may become disabled when particular vulnerabilities are 
realized, creating the need for accommodation or protection from 
discrimination. Legal and social structures either may seek to address 
universal vulnerability generally, that is before it becomes realized, or to 
address vulnerability after it rises to disability. Currently the only 
example of the former approach is the movement toward universal 
design, or creating physical environments that accommodate multiple 
ways of functioning.150 An example of the latter approach—one that 
acknowledges vulnerability as existing across environments but that 
requires eligibility for protections—are the Social Security programs for 
disabled citizens providing wage and health care supports.151 Universal 
design and the Social Security disability programs thus recognize 
universal vulnerability to varying degrees. 
Current disability antidiscrimination law responds to the 
                                                     
146. See, e.g., id. § 12101(a)(7) (“[I]ndividuals with disabilities are . . . relegated to a position of 
political powerlessness in our society . . . resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative 
of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.”). 
147. SILVERS, WASSERMAN & MAHOWALD, supra note 39, at 74. 
148. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 
(2008). 
149. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 44. 
150. See infra notes 226–28 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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vulnerabilities created by disability as if they were situational. Federal 
and parallel state laws address vulnerability within isolated contexts for 
certain individuals rather than more generally. The ADA covers the 
workplace,152 public services,153 places of public accommodation,154 and 
transportation.155 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973156 applies to recipients 
of federal grants and programs, and litigation under the Act focuses on 
contexts similar to those of the public service and employment titles of 
the ADA. Similarly, the Fair Housing Act157 and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act158 address discrete contexts. 
Protections are complicated further by the fact that the law focuses on 
individuals and their disabilities, rather than addressing shared 
vulnerabilities among disabled persons. This approach differs from the 
one taken with regard to elderly persons, where Social Security and 
Medicare are premised in part on the recognition of the high probability 
of manifest vulnerability at a certain age without the need for individual 
determination of impairment.159 Each of the above-mentioned disability 
protection acts requires a case-by-case inquiry for eligibility,160 meaning 
the circumstances of each individual (rather than the biological 
impairment itself) affect whether she is entitled to disability 
protections.161 As a result, the law does not recognize per se disabilities. 
Individuals with the same impairments may receive varying legal 
treatment, depending on their individual circumstances. Prior to the 
AAA, for example, individuals able to increase their functioning through 
drugs or devices were not disabled, whereas individuals who failed to 
                                                     
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
153. Id. §§ 12131–34. 
154. Id. §§ 12181–89. 
155. Id. §§ 12142–44, 12148, 12182(b)(2)(B), 12184. 
156. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 705–08, amended by ADA Amendments Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 7, 122 Stat. 3553, 3558 (2008). 
157. Fair Housing Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–07 (2000). 
158. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2000). 
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 414(a) (2000); see also infra note 195. 
160. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (discussing the case-by-case inquiry of the ADA); see also 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). But see U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 
535 U.S. 391, 403 (2001) (creating an exception to the case-by-case inquiry when disability 
accommodation requests interfere with seniority systems created by collective bargaining). 
161. Paul Steven Miller refers to the case-by-case inquiry as a “contextual definition of 
disability,” in the sense that there are no per se disabilities under the ADA. Miller, Reclaiming the 
Vision, supra note 13, at 770 (emphasis added). 
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mitigate the same disease with the requisite drugs were disabled.162 
While assessing individuals in a pre-mitigated state will allow greater 
numbers to qualify as disabled, some circumstances such as individual 
fortitude may still result in varying outcomes for individuals with the 
same condition.163 Further, with regard to illness, disease expression 
(severity) may vary per individual. The next two sections address the 
effects of fragmenting disability protection. 
2. Protection Interrupted 
As a result of laws treating vulnerability as arising in isolated 
transactions rather than as a part of an integrated experience, protections 
for disabled individuals are often interrupted, denying meaningful social 
participation. Someone may be able to enter a building but not partake in 
the services offered, for example.164 In addition, the ADA’s response to 
the increased vulnerability to unemployment of disabled individuals is to 
address vulnerability only in terms of functioning at the workplace. 
Disabled workers are entitled to an accommodation at the worksite or 
with regard to work schedules to assist them in completing the essential 
functions (fundamental duties)165 of their jobs.166 The Act does not 
                                                     
162. Compare Landry v. United Scaffolding, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 808, 816 (M.D. La. 2004 
(holding that plaintiff with epilepsy who controls his seizures with medication is not disabled), and 
Roland v. Becon Constr., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19702, at *13 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2002) (holding 
that plaintiff with epilepsy who takes medication and experiences seizures only at night is not 
disabled), with Otting v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704, 710–11 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
plaintiff who suffers seizures while medicated for epilepsy is disabled), and Rowles v. Automated 
Prod. Sys., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (M. D. Pa. 2000) (finding a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether plaintiff who takes medication for epilepsy and experiences a seizure a year is 
disabled). There may, of course, be individuals so profoundly impaired that they would be disabled 
in any circumstance. 
163.  The AAA accounts for “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications” as 
forms of mitigation. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 
3555. Fortitude and endurance arguably fall outside this context, however. 
164. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
165. EEOC Regulations state: “A job function may be considered essential for any of several 
reasons, including but not limited to the following: . . . the reason the position exists is to perform 
that function . . . [there are a] limited number of employees available [who can perform that 
function] . . . [and] [t]he function [is] highly specialized . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) (2008). 
Essential functions may be determined by a variety of sources including the employer, written job 
descriptions, collective bargaining agreements, the time an employee spends performing the 
function, the impact on the workplace of eliminating the function for the relevant employee, and the 
past and present work experiences of others. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3). 
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (defining a “qualified individual with a disability” as one who “with or 
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position 
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address barriers to employment outside the workplace, such as lack of 
transportation to work,167 accommodations that facilitate employment by 
aiding a person at work as well as at home,168 and employer-based health 
insurance that includes services for mental illness.169 
Viewing the vulnerabilities associated with disability as situational in 
this way also masks structural inequalities. Disability protections that 
target particular aspects of a disabled individual’s life, such as fulfilling 
the functions of her job or entering an insurance office, shift legal focus 
away from inequalities like wage disparities and health care policies that 
disfavor mental disability. Even if these structural inequalities are 
identified, the current approach to vulnerability, which seeks to provide 
localized remedies, cannot address them. 
The consequences of the interrupted protections of the situational 
approach to vulnerability have prompted scholars to turn prematurely to 
social welfare models to reduce disability discrimination.170 Scholars 
argue that it is necessary to appeal to social welfare programs to fill the 
gaps in protection, in particular with regard to employment.171 As I argue 
in Part III, however, if the vulnerabilities associated with disability and 
employment are understood to extend beyond the workplace proper (or 
under Titles II and III to include more meaningful access to services and 
places of public accommodation), many of the perceived shortcomings 
of the civil rights model may be addressed without turning to broad 
social welfare programs. For example, entry into the workplace and 
                                                     
that such individual holds or desires”). 
167. Transportation to work is generally considered a personal rather than an employment issue. 
See, e.g., Self v. Bd. of Review, 453 A.2d 170, 171 (N.J. 1982) (employees who voluntary left their 
employment because they were without transportation to work are not entitled to unemployment 
compensation). 
168. Under the ADA, an employer need not provide an accommodation that benefits the 
employee both at home and at work. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (“[R]easonable accommodation” means 
“making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and useable . . . job 
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition 
or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, 
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”). 
169. See infra notes 247–49 and accompanying text. 
170. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19; Bagenstos, Mend It, Don’t 
End It, supra note 42; Diller, supra note 10; Johnson, supra note 38; Mark C. Weber, Disability and 
the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 889, 940–56 (2000). 
171. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 19; Bagenstos, Mend It, Don’t 
End It, supra note 42; Diller, supra note 10; Johnson, supra note 38; Weber, supra note 170, at 
940–56. 
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disabled worker retention could be facilitated by more reliable 
Paratransit and workplace accommodations that benefit the employee at 
work as well as have utility at home. To be sure, some vulnerabilities 
associated with disability are best addressed by social welfare programs 
(I argue this is the case with medical needs), but that is a separate issue 
from whether there is more work to be done working within the civil 
rights paradigm. 
In addition, interrupted protections cause scholars to reexamine and 
undervalue the social model of disability, that is, the view that disability 
is socially constructed or of environmental origin.172 When disability is 
understood to be of environmental origin (social model of disability), 
and the relevant environment assessed is narrow (vulnerability as 
situational), the social model appears to limit disability protections.173 As 
a result, accommodations are restricted because they are made only to 
support an individual’s functioning within a particular environment. 
The problem, however, is not with the social model of disability, but 
with its current application under the ADA. It is the restricted scope of 
the environment rather than the concept of disability as socially 
constructed, or a civil rights approach more generally, that undermines 
protections. Within the civil rights framework, vulnerability to socially 
constructed disability may be understood to exist continuously and to 
extend across contexts instead of being situational. As argued in Part III, 
conceptualizing disability as involving universal vulnerabilities expands 
the environments for assessment beyond those related to a discrete 
aspect of a form of social participation, such as accommodation at the 
worksite, to those relevant for a form of social participation itself, like 
employment. 
 
                                                     
172. See, e.g., Stein & Stein, supra note 37, at 1208–12. The ADA adopts a functional definition 
of disability, in the sense that it looks to impairment of a major life activity or function. Because the 
definition looks to a “physical or mental impairment” that “substantially limits a major life activity,” 
it is often interpreted to be a mixture of the medical and social models of disability. “Impairment” is 
determined according to medical criteria, and the limitation of a major life activity considers social 
or environmental impediments to functioning. The medical model views disability as a biological 
defect (physical or mental impairment) to be ameliorated. See SILVERS, WASSERMAN & 
MAHOWALD, supra note 39, at 59–63. The social model views disability as environmentally created 
and requires social adjustment to facilitate functioning. Id. at 74–76. 
173. See, e.g., Stein & Stein, supra note 37, at 1208–12. 
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3. Artificial Restriction of the Protected Class 
Viewing the enhanced particular vulnerabilities associated with 
disability as situational also impairs membership in the protected class, 
exacerbating the limitations addressed in Section One of this Part. Class 
membership may be limited when an individual’s functioning is assessed 
within a small environment. Some individuals with significant 
impairments may not be considered disabled because they are able to 
function in particular circumstances or environments. For example, an 
individual who manages her rheumatoid arthritis partially with drugs and 
mostly with willpower, and is able to perform manual tasks working as 
an airline stewardess, might not be considered disabled for purposes of 
workplace assessment.174 This individual may be disabled, despite such 
measures, outside the workplace if her arthritis prevents her from 
performing vital household and personal tasks. 
On the other hand, class membership may be constrained when the 
environment assessed is expanded beyond the situation where an 
individual most acutely experiences impairment to functioning. 
Typically, the broader the context for assessing impairments of a major 
life activity, the less likely an individual is to be considered part of the 
protected class because she will be able to function in some portion of 
the environment. The disability threshold test requires that impairments 
to functioning are “substantial” for a particular environment.175 The 
breadth of the environment is determined by the major life activity 
affected. In some cases, the environment is extremely narrow: one’s own 
body. This is the case for the major life activities of walking, seeing, 
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and reproducing, for example.176 
Class membership is usually recognized with respect to significant 
impairment of these major life activities. In other cases, however, the 
relevant environment is broadly construed, and class membership is 
often denied. 
                                                     
174. Prior to the AAA, an individual was not considered disabled when she adapted by using 
drugs, devices, or other mitigating measures. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 
480 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999); Murphy v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520–21 (1999). 
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
176. See 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2(i) (2008) (“Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working.”); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639–41 (1998) (recognizing reproduction as 
a major life activity). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court looked to the “tasks that are of central 
importance to most people’s daily lives”177 to assess the major life 
activity of “performing manual tasks.” Applying this standard to a 
wrongful employment termination claim, the Court held that the relevant 
environment for assessing manual tasks is one’s home as well as one’s 
workplace: an employee who functions at home performing most 
manual tasks but is unable to complete the manual tasks associated with 
her job is not disabled.178 If the Court limited the relevant environment 
for performing manual tasks to the workplace (which arguably better 
aligns with the plaintiff’s legal claim), the employee would be 
disabled.179 While the AAA abandons the test that an individual must be 
“prevent[ed] or severely restrict[ed]” in tasks “of central importance to 
most people’s daily lives,” it is significant that the AAA would not 
change the outcome in this case if the relevant environment for assessing 
manual tasks continued to include both the home and the workplace.180   
Similarly, the Court indicates in dicta that if working is a major life 
activity (it is recognized as such under the AAA),181 an individual must 
be impaired in a “broad class of jobs” to be considered disabled.182 In 
other words, a particular job cannot be the relevant environment for 
assessing impairment of the major life activity of working. The EEOC 
regulations do not determine with specificity the breadth of the 
environment, but they consider both “[t]he geographical area in which 
the individual has reasonable access” as well as jobs “within [the 
immediate] geographical area . . . from which the individual is also 
disqualified.”183 
Strikingly, the Court’s assessment of the major life activities of 
                                                     
177.  Toyota Motor Mfg. of Ky., Inc. v. Williams 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002). 
178. Id. at 200–02. 
179. Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg. of Ky., Inc, 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 534 
U.S. 184 (2002). 
180. It is possible, however, that the plaintiff might be limited in a different major life activity, 
even within a broad environment for assessment. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008). (“An impairment that substantially limits one major 
life activity need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability.”). 
181. Id. § 3. 
182. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200 (quoting Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)); 
see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2001) (“With respect to the major life activity of working[,] [t]he 
term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs 
or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable 
training, skills and abilities.”). 
183. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A)–(C). 
SATZ-FINAL-FINAL.DOC 1/7/2009 12:48 PM 
Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
549 
performing manual tasks and working acknowledges that the human 
experience is not a fragmented one. The ability to perform manual tasks 
is recognized as relevant in both the public and private realms. The 
capability of working is understood to extend outside the immediate 
workplace environment and into the broader public realm. 
Unfortunately, the Court uses this perspective to determine that 
functioning in a particular environment requires the denial of disability 
protections, rather than to inform jurisprudence about constant 
vulnerabilities that may manifest at certain times. 
The Court’s treatment of the major life activities of performing 
manual tasks and working identifies a notable inconsistency in the 
judicial recognition of the relevant environmental boundaries for 
assessing an individual’s functioning for purposes of the ADA. The 
Court expands the environment-frame to deny protected class 
membership (for example, assessing the ability to perform manual tasks 
at home and at work) and contracts the environment-frame to limit 
entitlement to a remedy (for example, assessing the need for 
accommodation only within the workplace).184 As discussed earlier in 
this Part, the narrower the environment is for accommodation, the less 
likely an individual is to receive an accommodation that addresses her 
impairments because they probably extend beyond the environment 
assessed. Thus, treating impairments as situational in these contexts 
undermines disability protections in two ways: assessing a large 
environment may deny protected class membership, and using a small 
environment to determine entitlement to accommodation may not 
address impairments to functioning and fragment protections. If the 
expanded protected class under the AAA focuses the Court on 
remedy,185 the narrow environment-frame for accommodation may result 
in the denial of protections for disabled individuals. This is significant 
because it might shift the gatekeeping function from class membership 
to entitlement to remedy and continue to restrict disability protections. 
Viewing impairments as situational also disregards the benefits for 
disabled and nondisabled individuals alike of responding to vulnerability 
as a universal aspect of the human condition. All workers benefit from 
flexible work schedules or architectural design integrating ramps (for 
                                                     
184. This phenomenon is similar to the “time-framing” construct in criminal law described by 
Mark Kelman where laws implicitly embrace arbitrary time-frames to avoid certain political 
problems. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 591, 600–42 (1981). 
185. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text. 
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wheelchairs, strollers, or luggage on wheels), wider elevators and 
bathrooms, and lever door handles (easier to open when hands are 
occupied). A better approach would consider a diverse range of methods 
of functioning and design social programs and buildings accordingly. 
Such an approach is supported by Fineman’s vulnerability thesis. 
Section III applies the insights of Fineman’s vulnerability thesis to 
argue for a mixed civil rights/social welfare approach to disability law 
reform. The concept of disability as universal and constant vulnerability 
is discussed with regard to the four “second generation” disability 
discrimination problems identified in the introduction—remaining 
barriers to entry into the workforce, lack of material supports such as 
health care, constraints on accommodating atypical modes of 
functioning, and limitations on protected class membership due to what 
now may be understood as fragmenting disability protections. 
Susceptibility to disability discrimination must not be viewed as merely 
situational, requiring only material supports within limited public 
environments. Further, some shared vulnerabilities of disabled and 
nondisabled individuals, including those related to medical care, are best 
addressed through programs that do not require protected class 
membership. 
III. BLENDING CIVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
Disabled individuals continue to experience barriers to class 
membership, work, desired accommodation, and material support. The 
problems of protected class membership are only partially resolved by 
the AAA. Under the Act, individuals will be assessed in a pre-mitigated 
state and qualify for disability protections with impairments that do not 
“significantly restrict” a major life activity.186 Enlarging the protected 
class, however, places pressure on the reasonable accommodation 
mandate, which is currently unfunded. Further, some individuals with 
impairments will continue to be excluded from the class due to the 
nature of their impairments or the problems of fragmentation, raising the 
question of when the state should provide social welfare programs to 
address vulnerability. 
Fineman’s vulnerability thesis supports a move toward broad social 
welfare programs in areas such as employment, health care, and 
education. This would entail a departure from the civil rights approach to 
                                                     
186. AAA § 2(a)(8). 
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disability and other vulnerabilities and the restructuring of legal and 
social institutions to respond to universal vulnerability. In the 
employment context, institutions would address the shared 
vulnerabilities of disabled and other workers associated with barriers to 
entry and accessing accommodations that facilitate employment. As 
William Johnson argues, workers disabled as adults face similar barriers 
to reentry into the workforce as those unemployed by workforce cut-
backs or factory closings: “low skills, intermittent or marginal 
employment, [and] the relative ease with which an employer can find 
replacement workers . . . .”187 Workers who are not disabled are worse 
off in the sense that they are ineligible for Social Security Disability 
Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, and corresponding health care 
benefits.188 
The approach I advocate is a compromise. I employ the insights of 
Fineman’s theory to understand the problems with the way in which the 
ADA responds to disability. Vulnerability theory reveals that the goals 
of the ADA of increasing employment and reducing isolation are not 
fulfilled by equal protection or sameness treatment. Rather, they require 
accommodation that responds to universal and constant vulnerability that 
may give rise to discrimination. I do not argue, as Fineman does, that the 
liberal subject must be replaced by the vulnerable subject. My view is 
that legal structures do not have to be shaped exclusively around one or 
the other but rather that it is possible for them to respond to a “liberal 
subject who has universal vulnerabilities.” In other words, our 
conception of the autonomous individual under traditional democratic 
theory is impoverished.189 Vulnerability theory demonstrates that 
disability and the vulnerabilities associated with it are part of the human 
condition and helps to inform our picture of the individual at the center 
of democratic theory. In practical terms, this means that I advocate law 
reform that appeals to both the civil rights and social welfare paradigms 
to address the significant impediments to the social participation of 
disabled persons. 
In Subpart A, I advocate a mixed civil rights/social welfare approach 
to employment. While class membership will be restricted in accordance 
                                                     
187. Johnson, supra note 38, at 168–69. 
188. Id. Displaced workers who are not disabled receive unemployment and health benefits for a 
limited period after their termination, the latter at a higher premium then when they were employed. 
Id. 
189. I thank Emory Law Professor Tim Terrell for this point. 
SATZ-FINAL-FINAL.DOC 1/7/2009 12:48 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:513, 2008 
552 
with an antidiscrimination approach, accommodations will be more 
broadly available and subsidized by the state as a matter of social 
welfare. This Subpart discusses the role of reasonable accommodation in 
addressing barriers to employment, including lack of material supports 
such as transportation, and in supporting atypical modes of functioning. I 
argue that the reasonable accommodation mandate must be given a 
broader social purpose—one that extends beyond what formal equality 
requires but continues to rely on membership in the protected class. 
Vulnerability will be addressed as constant and universal for disabled 
individuals rather than as situational. 
In Subpart B, I argue that the state should adopt a social welfare 
approach to health care to address universal vulnerability. Illness is 
perhaps the prime example of a universal and constant vulnerability. 
When manifest, it significantly heightens other vulnerabilities for 
disabled and nondisabled people alike; it is not a disability issue. Access 
to health care must be addressed outside the civil rights context. 
The difference in my approach to employment and health care stems 
largely from practical considerations. In the employment context, I do 
not believe that a radical departure from the formal equality approach to 
disability discrimination to a system addressing the universal 
vulnerability of workers is politically feasible. Historical resistance to 
expanding most social welfare programs,190 declining benefits of 
existing programs,191 and sustained periods of low unemployment during 
solid financial times192 provide support for this view. In addition, the 
history of oppression of individuals with disabilities and the staggering 
numbers of disabled persons who are denied entry into the workplace 
bolster an approach that focuses on disability as a protected class. The 
                                                     
190.  See generally Margaret R. Somers & Fred Block, From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, 
Markets, and Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debate, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 260 (2005) 
(discussing how social welfare regimes fail in light of market-based approaches to wealth 
distribution due to “the perversity thesis,” or the view that social welfare contributes to the plight of 
the poor). 
191.  See, e.g., Robert Moffitt, David Ribar & Mark Wilhelm, The Decline of Welfare Benefits in 
the U.S.: The Role of Wage Inequality, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 421, 423–24 (1998). 
192.  See, e.g., Rebecca M. Blank, Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Fighting 
Poverty: Lessons from Recent U.S. History, 14 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2000, at 7 (discussing 
consistently low unemployment rates during economic prosperity in the 1990s); see also U.S. Dep’t 
of Labor, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, 
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS140
00000 (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) (indicating low unemployment rates during times of economic 
prosperity from 1998–2002 and 2006–2008), permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n192.pdf. 
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ADA may in fact be understood as a law that seeks to draw a particularly 
isolated protected class into the greater polity, whereas other civil rights 
mandates speak to various protected classes. 
Universal health care is a political and practical possibility, however. 
Forty-six million Americans are uninsured,193 and studies indicate that 
twenty-five million adults are underinsured, as measured by medical 
expenses relative to income.194 Large-scale government health care 
programs already operate,195 and public spending on health care is at 
sixty percent.196 Unsurprisingly, the last three presidential elections 
witnessed universal health care as a platform.197 
                                                     
193. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 19 
(2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf, permanent copy available 
at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n193.pdf. 
194.  Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. Adults, 2003 and 
2007, HEALTH AFF., Jun. 10, 2008, at w300, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.27.4.w298v1?ijkey=rhRn2Tr4HAKZ.&keytype=r
ef&siteid=healthaff, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n194.pdf. 
195. Government programs include Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP), the military entitlement programs (TRICARE and the Civilian Health and 
Medical Program of the Department of Veteran Affairs (CHAMPVA)), and the Federal Employees 
Health Benefits Program. Medicaid and SCHIP operate at the state level with federal oversight, and 
the other programs are federal. Medicare provides “basic protection against the costs of hospital, 
related post-hospital, home health services, and hospice care” for all individuals age 65 or over, 
certain disabled individuals who are government or railroad employees, and individuals suffering 
from end-stage renal disease. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000). Medicaid provides “medical assistance on 
behalf of families with dependent children and of the aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose 
income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.” Id. § 1396. 
Medicaid is typically provided to individuals at or below 150 percent of the federal poverty line, 
which is currently $20,650 for a family of four. See, e.g., Kaiser Family Found., Income Eligibility 
for Parents Applying for Medicaid by Annual Income as a Percent of Federal Poverty Level (FPL), 
2008, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=205&cat=4 (last visited Dec. 22, 
2008), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev 
513n195.pdf; see also Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 72 Fed. Reg. 3147 (Jan. 24, 
2007). SCHIP provides basic medical coverage to children ineligible for Medicaid; its target 
population is children in families at or below 200 percent of the federal poverty line. State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa–jj (2000); 42 C.F.R. 457.310(b)(1)(i) 
(2007) (describing “targe[t] low-income child”). 
196. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying for National Health Insurance—And 
Not Getting It, 21 HEALTH AFF. 88, 91, 94 (2002) (“Public funding” includes all tax-financed health 
care, such as health care and research programs, hospital subsidies, individual and employer tax 
subsidies, and government employee health care plans.). 
197. See, e.g., Robin Toner, 2008 Candidates Vow to Overhaul U.S. Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 6, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/06/us/politics/06health.html, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n197a.pdf; 
Robin Toner, The 2004 Campaign: The Issue: Democrats See a New Urgency in Health Care, N.Y. 
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I do not mean to suggest that law reform efforts should abandon the 
push for greater equity in employment irrespective of identity categories. 
Women, racial minorities, unskilled laborers, disabled workers whose 
impairments limit their productivity,198 and individuals whose 
impairments do not rise to legally cognizable disabilities also face 
barriers to employment due to fragmented protections of their 
vulnerabilities. Ideally, the state would respond to all such 
vulnerabilities. 
A.  Rethinking Reasonable Accommodation 
This Section argues that the reasonable accommodation mandate must 
account for the universal vulnerabilities of disabled individuals in social 
and civic life. This requires that the mandate have a broader social or 
redistributive purpose than that embodied in the ADA. Broadening the 
scope of reasonable accommodation entails a mixed civil rights/social 
welfare approach to accommodation. Eligibility for accommodation 
remains tied to membership in the protected class, though vulnerabilities 
of disabled individuals are viewed as extending across contexts. As a 
result, disabled persons are entitled to greater material resources as 
enabled by government support. While expanding the reasonable 
accommodation mandate does not reflect the intent of the drafters of the 
ADA,199 it supports stated congressional goals of decreasing barriers of 
entry for disabled workers and lessening isolation more generally.200 
Such an expansion substantially addresses employment barriers for 
disabled individuals occurring outside the workplace, including lack of 
reliable transportation and accommodations that benefit an employee at 
work as well as at home. The focus of this Section is employment, but I 
briefly discuss how my concept of reasonable accommodation might 
                                                     
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/14/politics/campaigns/14HEAL.html, permanent copy available 
at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n197b.pdf; James Dao, The 2000 
Campaign: The Challenger; Bradley Nod to Clinton on Universal Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
23, 2000, at A18, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9404EEDB1330F930A15751C0A9669C8B63, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n197c.pdf. 
198. These workers are not “qualified individuals with a disability” for purposes of the ADA if 
they are unable to fulfill the essential functions of their job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000), amended 
by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
199. See, e.g., Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference, supra note 9, at 637–40. 
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(3), (5), (9), (b). 
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facilitate greater accommodation of multiple ways of functioning for 
people utilizing public services or places of public accommodation. 
1. Addressing Barriers to Employment 
Individuals with disabilities continue to face substantial barriers to 
receiving and maintaining employment. Prior to the passage of the ADA, 
the Congressional Record indicates that “[t]wo-thirds of all disabled 
Americans between the age of 16 and 64 are met [sic] working . . . . 
Sixty-six percent of working-age disabled persons . . . say that they 
would like to have a job . . . . [T]his means that about 8.2 million people 
with disabilities want to work but cannot find a job.”201 As of today, 
statistics indicate the same or lower rates of employment.202 Evidence 
also suggests that the greatest problems for workers disabled as adults 
(the majority of disabled individuals) are obstacles to reemployment 
following disabling incidents, rather than structural issues such as wage 
discrimination.203 
Commentators suggest that the potential barriers to employment (and 
arguably to reentry into the workplace) for disabled individuals include 
employer concern that accommodations will be costly, employee 
difficulty maintaining necessary work schedules due to lack of 
transportation or accommodations at home, and the absence of legally 
mandated accommodations for workers whose impairments limit their 
productivity.204 The first two difficulties—employer fear of 
accommodation costs and employee need for material supports related to 
working—pertain to accommodating productive workers as mandated by 
the ADA.205 Employing individuals with impairments that limit their 
productivity, in particular those born with severe disabilities, would 
entail social commitment to a stronger view of equity and the value of 
employment for all persons.206 I do not address this latter issue, though it 
                                                     
201. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314 
(citing STEWART LEICHENKO, ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED 
AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 47–50 (1986)). 
202. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
203. Johnson, supra note 38, at 168–69. 
204. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text discussing accommodation; see also 
Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 26 (discussing lack of material supports); Johnson, supra note 38, at 
164 (discussing how the ADA does not adequately address workers with limited productivity). 
205. See supra note 166 and accompanying text discussing a “qualified individual with a 
disability.” 
206. Johnson, supra note 38, at 168. 
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warrants serious discussion elsewhere. 
Current accommodations under the ADA are limited even for 
productive workers. In theory, disabled persons are entitled to the same 
benefits that individuals without disabilities receive, namely, jobs as 
well as access to services and places of public accommodation. The 
scope of the remedy is dictated by a statutorily recognized environment 
or situation. Disabled workers may be provided with “job related” 
accommodations to function in the workplace.207 A reasonable 
accommodation is not required if employers establish that it poses an 
“undue hardship”208 or a “direct threat” to the health or safety of 
others.209 Access to services and places of public accommodation most 
often amounts to physical access rather than meaningful enjoyment of 
services or public space. Public areas outside the workplace must be 
accessible unless alterations to existing structures are not “readily 
achievable”;210 public services need not be altered if they require an 
undue burden or a “fundamental alteration” of the “nature of the service, 
program, or activity.”211 
As it stands, the reasonable accommodation provision is redistributive 
in a pure sense: with the exception of scarce government subsidies, 
resources are taken from employers and other firms to make 
accommodations. The framers of the ADA did not intend for the Act to 
be more broadly redistributive, that is, to require a shift of wealth or 
material resources from firms to disabled persons beyond that required 
by the antidiscrimination mandate.212 Even within this narrow context, 
commentators question whether the role of the reasonable 
accommodation provision under Title I is to shift costs of workplace 
accommodations to employers or to require that the employer and 
                                                     
207. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
208. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
209. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (holding that a 
direct threat is one that poses a “significant risk” to others, as indicated by “medical or other 
objective evidence”). 
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The statute defines “readily achievable” as “easily 
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense . . . . [F]actors to be 
considered include—the nature and cost of the action . . . the overall financial resource of the 
facility . . . the overall financial resources of the covered entity . . . and the [nature] of the 
operation . . . .” Id. § 12181(9). New construction must comply with the ADA. Id. §§ 12146, 
12183(a). 
211. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(7), 35.150(a)(3) (2008). 
212. See Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference, supra note 9, at 637–40. 
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employee both contribute to accommodation (cost-sharing).213 
Under the mixed civil rights/social welfare approach I advocate, 
protected class members would receive accommodations that exceed the 
scope of the current antidiscrimination mandate (and formal equality). 
The reasonable accommodation mandate would be expanded with more 
robust government supports for disabled workers.214 Employees who are 
susceptible to impairment would receive accommodations throughout 
their daily environments. For example, disabled workers may receive 
accommodations for transportation to work or tools that facilitate their 
functioning at home as well as at the workplace. 
This expansion of the reasonable accommodation mandate requires 
law reform on two fronts. First, it is necessary to create funding 
structures to relieve employers from the financial burden of fulfilling all 
reasonable accommodations. The legislature could determine a ceiling 
for the percentage of annual earnings an employer is required to spend 
on accommodations for disabled employees. Affected employers as 
currently defined by the ADA215 would not be required to fund 
accommodations outside this amount. Government subsidies would 
begin where employer subsidization ends.216 This approach would allow 
employer responsibility for accommodations to be capped, while 
expanding disability protections beyond discrete environments. 
                                                     
213. Id. at 636–70; see also Elizabeth A. Pendo, Disability, Doctors and Dollars: Distinguishing 
the Three Faces of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 1180–86 (2002). 
214. I want to emphasize that I am making a normative argument for the expansion of the 
reasonable accommodation mandate. I am not making a cost-benefit argument or considering the 
constraints of current budgets. 
215. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in industry 
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more 
calendar weeks . . . .”). The definition of “employer” does not include the United States, Indian 
tribes, or private firms exempt from taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c). Id.§ 12111(5)(B). 
216. Current subsidies are limited. The Work Opportunity Credit provides a tax credit of up to 
forty percent of the first $6000 ($2400) of an employee’s qualified first-year wages. I.R.C. § 51(a) 
(2008); see also IRS Form 5884, Work Opportunity Credit (OMB No. 1545-0219) (2007), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f5884.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n216a.pdf. Employers of veterans with a 
service-related disability are eligible for up to twice that amount. I.R.C. § 51(d)(1)(b), 51(d)(3). The 
Disabled Access Credit provides a credit for up to $10,000 per year for disability accommodations 
made by businesses earning $1 million or less or with fewer than 31 full-time employees. Id. § 44; 
see also IRS Form 8826, Disabled Access Credit (OMB No. 1545-1205) (2006), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8826.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n216b.pdf. The Architectural Barrier 
Removal Tax Deduction provides a deduction of up to $15,000 per year for expenses that remove 
architectural or transportation barriers for disabled or elderly individuals. I.R.C. § 190 (2008). The 
Disability Access Credit and the Barrier Removal Tax Deduction may be obtained in the same year. 
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Second, the interactive process recommended by the EEOC, a process 
by which employers engage employees in a dialogue about the 
accommodation that would best facilitate their functioning, must be 
federally mandated and refined. During this process, employees would 
identify accommodations they need to function in the workplace as well 
as those that may assist them indirectly with their employment by 
enabling their functioning at home. The law would require that adaptive 
tools benefitting an individual in her workplace as well as at home and 
in other environments be given preference. In addition, preference would 
be given to accommodations that support employees’ desired modes of 
functioning, whether they are typical (for example, walking with braces) 
or atypical (wheeling). The undue hardship test would remain as a 
defense for failing to make an accommodation, though the burden would 
be measured taking into account government subsidies for which the 
employer is eligible, even if the employer fails to apply for them. 
To the extent this approach forces a reexamination of the norms of the 
workplace, I believe it may go some distance in addressing structural 
inequalities for disabled workers. The mandated interactive process, 
coupled with the provision of reasonable accommodation to facilitate 
functioning across various environments, would focus more attention on 
the systemic treatment of disabled workers. Federal funds for 
accommodations could be made contingent on the hiring and retention 
practices (including pay equity) of employers with respect to disabled 
employees. I believe this approach holds more promise for addressing 
bias against disabled workers than asking employers to make local 
changes. Seeking change from within individual workplaces asks 
employers, who are in a position of advantage, to reexamine their 
practices.217 Imposing uniform incentives for change may provide a 
much greater impetus for altering stigmatizing or exclusionary 
procedures and policies. 
2. Supporting Atypical Modes of Functioning 
In addition to addressing barriers to employment, the mixed civil 
rights/social welfare approach to reasonable accommodation would 
provide greater support for atypical ways of functioning for employees. 
                                                     
217. Bagenstos discusses a “structural” approach to antidiscrimination law, which would rely on 
the law to identify norms that reduce workplace bias (including unconscious bias) and empower 
employees, but does not believe it will be successful due to difficulties with implementation. 
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 81, at 4. 
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This approach recognizes that the vulnerabilities associated with 
disability, while part of the human condition, are uniquely experienced 
by each individual.218 The ultimate choice of a reasonable 
accommodation would remain with the employer, but the mandated 
interactive process would give preference to employees’ preferred 
modes of functioning. A disabled employee may favor typing with her 
feet instead of her upper arm prosthetics, working in a dark office space 
rather than wearing shaded glasses to address light sensitivity, or 
working from the floor rather than a cushioned chair to avoid back pain. 
The employer’s comfort with atypical modes of functioning is not 
relevant, so long as the employee is able to fulfill the essential functions 
of her job.219 
As I discuss in previous work, the role of typical or normal 
functioning (the importance of functioning as most people do) is not 
directly addressed by the courts, and current judicial treatment of 
functioning is inconsistent and misguided.220 Most Supreme Court case 
law under Title I indicates that when the Court considers the relevance 
of normal functioning in relation to workplace accommodations, it does 
so under the disability threshold test in a manner that excludes 
individuals with impairments from the protected class.221 If an individual 
is able to function atypically, she is denied disability protections.222 
When it comes to the issue of accommodation, however, the Court does 
not give preference to an employee’s preferred mode of functioning, be 
it typical or atypical.223 Thus, the Court has it exactly backwards: 
effective atypical functioning is considered a barrier to disability class 
membership but is not treated as a relevant factor for accommodation.224 
The AAA broadens protected class membership, though individuals who 
function atypically with mitigating measures that are not legally 
recognized may still be excluded.225 My approach requires that 
                                                     
218. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text. 
220. See Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction, supra note 27, at 243–48. 
221. Id. at 245–46. 
222. Id. The AAA lessens the impact of this to some extent by assessing an individual for 
disability in a pre-mitigated state. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122 
Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008). 
223. See Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction, supra note 27, at 246–48. 
224. Id. at 248–65. 
225.  See supra note 163 and accompanying text discussing willpower and fortitude as a 
mitigating measure. 
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individuals are assessed prior to all mitigating measures. 
Supporting atypical functioning under Title II (public services) and 
Title III (public accommodations) is more complex than under Title I. It 
requires facilitating meaningful access to key areas of social and civic 
participation; access into various physical spaces is insufficient. For 
example, an individual should be able to enter a movie theater as well as 
experience a film, board a commuter train and signal for a stop, and 
access a public library as well as appreciate its collection. Given the 
number of people partaking in these experiences and the variety of ways 
in which people function, reasonable accommodation in these contexts 
will require a more radical departure from current practices than in the 
employment context. Funds must be allotted to improve the provision of 
transportation and other services. While government subsidies may 
enable private firms to make greater structural changes, most efficient 
change will likely not occur through renovation but with new 
construction that aims to support more ways of functioning. 
Universal design, “the design of products and environments to be 
usable by all people, to the greatest extent possible, without the need for 
adaptation or specialized design,”226 may ultimately be the most 
economical way to address the vulnerabilities of disabled individuals 
arising from physical spaces. Universal design relies on seven principles: 
“equitable use,” “flexibility in use,” “simple and intuitive” use, 
“perceptible information,” “tolerance for error,” “low physical effort,” 
and “size and space” appropriate for use.227 These principles could also 
guide the initial planning of the infrastructure for a facility’s service 
operations. By accommodating a greater number of ways of functioning 
at the construction stage, fewer buildings would need to be retrofitted as 
access issues arise. Universal design responds to impairments that may 
not be considered disabilities under law, however, and supports 
impairments to functioning and universal vulnerability more 
                                                     
226.  The Ctr. for Universal Design, N.C. State Univ., About UD, 
http://www.design.ncsu.edu/cud/about_ud/about_ud.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2008), permanent 
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n226.pdf; see also 
ROBERT F. ERLANDSON, UNIVERSAL AND ACCESSIBLE DESIGN FOR PRODUCTS, SERVICES, AND 
PROCESSES 17 (2008).  
227. The Ctr. for Universal Design, N.C. State Univ., UD Principles, 
http://www.design.ncsu.edu/cud/about_ud/udprincipleshtmlformat.html#top (last visited Dec. 24, 
2008), permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n227.pdf; see also ERLANDSON, supra 
note 226, at 67 (“ergonomically sound, perceptible, cognitively sound, flexible, error-managed 
(proofed), efficient, stable and predictable, equitable”). 
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generally.228 As a result, it extends beyond what my framework (or the 
ADA) requires for reasonable accommodation, and individuals would 
implement universal design principles on a voluntary basis.  
One area where a universal approach to vulnerability may be 
politically and practically feasible is health care. I argue in the next 
Subpart that the issues facing disabled individuals with regard to health 
care access are likely best addressed by moving away from the civil 
rights paradigm altogether. 
B. Disability and Health Care Justice 
This Subpart argues that access to health care is a universal 
vulnerability rather than a disability issue and that vulnerability analysis 
provides a strong argument for a social welfare (universal) approach to 
health care. To be clear, I do not intend in this brief discussion to 
provide a comprehensive normative argument for universal health care; I 
have done so in other work.229 My goal is to provide arguments for why 
illness is not a disability issue but a matter of universal and constant 
vulnerability. I suggest that this concept of vulnerability lends support to 
a move away from government insurance programs that target particular 
groups of individuals to a more comprehensive state response to medical 
needs. Viewing illness as universal and constant vulnerability 
contributes a new perspective on the need for universal health care. 
Restructuring current health care institutions to support health care as a 
public good may be the best way to address vulnerability to illness and 
the vulnerabilities that result from illness. 
First and foremost, disability does not equate with illness. The 
population of individuals who are ill or medically fragile exceeds the 
disability class. Illness may give rise to disability, but it does not 
presuppose it.230 All individuals are vulnerable to illness. When such 
vulnerabilities are realized, they result in dependencies for care and 
impairments that may or may not be disabling. Thus, disabled and 
nondisabled individuals alike are vulnerable to illness and share 
                                                     
228.  See ERLANDSON , supra note 226, at 6. 
229. See Ani B. Satz, Toward Solving the Health Care Crisis: The Paradoxical Case for 
Universal Access to High Technology, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 93 (2008); Ani B. 
Satz, The Limits of Health Care Reform, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1451 (2008). 
230.  See, e.g., WENDELL, supra note 90, at 20 (arguing that chronic illness may be disabling); 
SILVERS, WASSERMAN & MAHOWALD, supra note 39, at 79 (arguing that illness normally does not 
constitute a disability though “disability often is a sequela of illness and . . . illness, especially 
chronic illness, can itself be disabling.”). 
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vulnerabilities from illness. Without health, disabled and nondisabled 
individuals cannot work or socially integrate. Indeed, philosophers argue 
that for this reason health care is a vital social good.231 
Second, current legal structures that impede access to health care for 
disabled individuals also disadvantage individuals who are not disabled. 
Access to care may be understood both as the ability to obtain health 
insurance as well as the ability to have necessary services under a health 
plan (the content of health insurance). Health insurance is provided 
through public and private mechanisms. Public insurance is offered 
through government entitlement and government employee benefit 
programs, and private insurers offer group or individual health care 
plans.232 Most health insurance in the United States is provided through 
private employee benefit plans.233 Government programs target only 
particular segments of the population, including disabled individuals 
who are eligible for Social Security benefits.234 Employers are not 
required to offer health insurance plans or any particular level of 
benefits, so long as employees are treated in the same manner.235 Lack of 
health insurance is therefore a problem for both disabled and 
nondisabled individuals. In fact, disabled persons who receive Social 
Security benefits may receive more support through federal programs 
                                                     
231. See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985); THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING 
RAWLS 181–96 (1989); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 50 (1999). 
232. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. Private payors include indemnity insurers, 
employers (self-insured or insured through private companies), and a variety of managed care 
arrangements.  
233.  See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2007 SUMMARY OF 
FINDINGS 1, available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/Summary-of-Findings-EHBS-
2007.pdf (158 million Americans receive health insurance through their employer), permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n233a.pdf. Employers pay 
74.4 percent of health care expenses for their employees. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SPONSORS OF HEALTH CARE COSTS, 
BUSINESSES, HOUSEHOLDS, AND GOVERNMENTS, 1987-2006 Table 4, available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/bhg08.pdf, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n233b.pdf. 
234. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
235. As one commentator notes: 
Under civil rights principles it is sufficient that people with disabilities have equal access to 
insurance offices and, once inside those offices, have equal right to purchase insurance policies 
having the same contents as policies purchased by nondisabled persons. Changing the terms or 
contents of the insurance policies so that people with disabilities receive coverage equal to that 
provided to nondisabled people, however, requires affirmative action that goes beyond basic 
civil rights premises.  
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 382 (2001). 
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than those without disability. 
Similarly, disabled and nondisabled individuals with health insurance 
may not receive coverage for the services they need. So long as plans 
provide contracted-for benefits, they are allowed to employ cost-
containment mechanisms that may result in the denial of certain 
services.236 The ADA provides that such distinctions may not be 
disability-based, however. Under Title V, the plan must be “bona fide” 
and “underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks” 
may not be “used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapters I 
and III.”237 A bona fide plan is understood as one with clear contractual 
terms that pays benefits.238 Title I pertains to employers, and Title III to 
places of public accommodation, including insurance offices.239 While 
the plain language of Title III requires that individuals have physical 
access to insurance offices, a few courts have applied the title to the 
health care services covered by an insurance policy.240 
The EEOC Guidance on Disability-Based Distinctions in Employer 
Provided Health Insurance241 defines a disability-based distinction as 
one that “singles out a particular disability (e.g., deafness, AIDS, 
schizophrenia), a discrete group of disabilities (e.g., cancers, muscular 
dystrophies, kidney diseases), or disability in general (e.g., non-coverage 
of all conditions that substantially limit a major life activity).”242 
Examples of illegal disability-based distinctions by employers include 
                                                     
236. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220–22 (2000). 
237. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
238. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Interim Enforcement Guidance on the 
Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to Disability-Based Distinctions in 
Employer Provided Health Insurance, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (June 8, 1993), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/health.html [hereinafter EEOC Interim Enforcement Guidance], 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n238.pdf. 
The EEOC regulations do not define “bona fide” plan for purposes of the ADA, though it is defined 
in the regulations implementing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. § 
1625.10(a)(2)(b) (2008) (“A plan is considered ‘bona fide’ if its terms (including cessation of 
contributions or accruals in the case of retirement income plans) have been accurately described in 
writing to all employees and if it actually provides the benefits in accordance with the terms of the 
plan.”). 
239. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). 
240.  See, e.g., Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559–60 (7th Cir. 1999); Pallozzi v. 
Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1999); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. 
Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, 37 F.3d 12, 19–20 (1st Cir. 1994); Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. 
Co., No. 94 C 4416, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14103, at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1995). 
241. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
242. EEOC Interim Enforcement Guidance, supra note 238, § (7)(III)(B). 
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refusing to insure individuals based on HIV status, capping 
reimbursement for the treatment of neurological conditions, or lowering 
health care upon retirement based on disability status.243 An insurance 
policy may distinguish broadly between a “multitude of dissimilar 
conditions” and limit access to disabled individuals, so long as it 
imposes the same restriction on individuals without disability.244 
Limitations on certain medical procedures, waiting periods for 
preexisting conditions, and caps on coverage are examples of allowed 
constraints that may affect the ability of disabled and nondisabled 
individuals alike to access care.245 Further, a plan is not a subterfuge if 
its disability distinctions are based on actuarially sound principles that 
treat disabled and nondisabled individuals the same, are necessary to 
preserve the plan’s solvency, or are required to avoid undermining or 
significantly altering the plan for other employees.246 
Until recently, complete parity between mental and physical health 
care benefits was not required, under the views that mental health care 
services are provided to individuals who have statutorily recognized 
disabilities as well as to those who do not, and mental health care covers 
a range of dissimilar conditions.247 The recent Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008248 mandates complete parity between 
physical and mental health benefits for insurers who offer plans that 
cover mental health care services. Caps on annual or lifetime spending, 




246. Id. § 7(III)(C)(2). 
247.  The EEOC argues that long-term disability plans that distinguish between mental and 
physical conditions are disability-based, and courts are split on the issue. Compare Fletcher v. Tufts 
Univ., 367 F. Supp. 2d 99, 111, 114 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2005) (finding that termination of disability 
payments based on mental disability but not physical disability violates Title I), with EEOC v. Bath 
Iron Works Corp., No. 97-355-P-H, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10600, at *17–22 (D. Me. Feb. 8, 1999) 
(finding that defendant company’s two-year limit on benefits for mental or nervous disorders but 
not physical ones does not violate Title I). 
248.  Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 511 
(2008). Previously, complete parity was not required. See, e.g., Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(a)(1)-(2) (2000); EEOC Interim Enforcement Guidance, supra note 238 
(“Typically, a lower level of benefits is provided for the treatment of mental/nervous conditions 
than is provided for the treatment of physical conditions . . . . Such broad distinctions, which apply 
to the treatment of a multitude of dissimilar conditions and which constrain individuals both with 
and without disabilities, are not distinctions based on disability . . . . and do not violate the ADA.”); 
Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1113–18 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no 
violation of Titles I and III for disparity between mental and physical disability benefits under 
employee disability insurance policy); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–14 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (same).  
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coinsurance, deductibles, and the number of covered visits must be the 
same for physical and mental health benefits.249 Insurers, including 
employers, need not offer any mental health benefits, however. 
Thus, individuals who are disabled face the same barriers as other 
patients to access to health care in terms of being able to obtain health 
insurance and having coverage for the particular services they need. 
Complicating factors include the high rates of unemployment for 
disabled individuals who do not qualify for Social Security benefits 
based on permanent disability, a possible higher consumption of health 
care resources, health care rationing schemes that disfavor those with 
medical impairments, and difficulty moving between assistance 
programs that include health care and the workforce. Arguably, 
individuals who are not disabled are also vulnerable in similar terms, 
however. Unskilled workers and at-will employees are vulnerable to 
unemployment; unskilled workers have a smaller range of employment 
opportunities than skilled workers, and at-will employees are vulnerable 
to discharge. Individuals who are not disabled may also require a 
significant amount of health care services. In fact, elderly persons and 
premature infants are the greatest consumers of health care resources, 
with high costs for care during the last or the first few months of life.250 
Further, elderly as well as disabled individuals may be 
disproportionately impacted by the metrics used to ration care and to 
segregate risk. In Oregon, for example, care for the indigent through 
Medicaid is rationed based on predicted health outcomes and cost.251 
                                                     
249.  H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 512. 
250.  In 2004, health care expenditures for people 65 years and older were $531.46 billion, which 
is 5.6 times the amount spent on children and 3.3 times the cost of care for adults. CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH CARE 
EXPENDITURES BY AGE, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/ 
downloads/2004-age-tables.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
wlr/notes/83washlrev513n250a.pdf. Of course, some of these individuals may be disabled. In 2005, 
the estimated “social cost” (“medical, education, and lost productivity”) of preterm births was $26.2 
billion. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Features–Premature Births, 
http://www.cdc.gov/Features/PrematureBirth/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2008), permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ wlr/notes/83washlrev513n250b.pdf. 
251. Health care services are scaled in order of priority. Jonathan Oberlander, Health Reform 
Interrupted: The Unraveling of the Oregon Health Plan, HEALTH AFF., Dec. 19, 2006, at w96, 
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/26/1/w96, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n251a.pdf. During 2008–2009, the 
Oregon Medicaid plan will provide 503 of the 680 basic health services the state aspires to cover. 
Or. Health Servs. Comm’n, Current Prioritized List, available at http://www.oregon.gov/OHPPR 
/HSC/current_prior.html, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
83washlrev513n251b.pdf. 
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Disabled, elderly, and medically fragile individuals may face double 
jeopardy if they are medically needy but not entitled to health care 
resources based on their perceived health status or length of life. Under 
private insurance schemes, those with existing illnesses may be viewed 
as high-risk insureds. While the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act252 provides some protections for continued insurance 
for individuals previously covered under group health insurance plans, 
high-risk individuals who retain insurance may be forced to pay high 
premiums.253 
Temporarily unemployed disabled and other individuals may 
experience difficulty moving between social welfare programs for the 
unemployed that include health care and the workforce. William 
Johnson notes that health insurance is vital for disabled individuals to 
forego Social Security disability benefits,254 and wages must be 
significantly higher for all individuals to fund health care for a chronic 
condition.255 While the Ticket to Work Incentives Improvement Act 
(1999) remedies this issue to some extent for disabled individuals, it 
leaves eligible workers uninsured after eight and a half years.256 
In sum, vulnerability to illness as well as the vulnerabilities and 
dependencies created by illness with respect to access to care are not 
disability issues. Illness is in fact the paradigmatic example of universal 
vulnerability. The universal vulnerability thesis explicated in this Article 
lends support (and perhaps a new voice) to a move toward universal 
health care.  
On a practical level, responding to vulnerability to illness through a 
patchwork of programs that target certain groups—disabled, indigent, 
elderly, and minor-age persons—has historically failed to insure the 
                                                     
252. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
253.  See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-100, PRIVATE HEALTH 
INSURANCE: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING 1996 FEDERAL STANDARDS 12–14 
(1999) (premiums for individual plans for nonsmoker with juvenile-onset diabetes range from 100–
464 percent of the standard premium), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99100.pdf, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n253.pdf. 
254. See Johnson, supra note 38, at 171. 
255. See id.; see also supra note 194 and accompanying text discussing underinsurance.   
256.  The Act extends Medicare Part A (hospital) premium-free coverage for disability 
beneficiaries who return to work. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 202, 113 Stat. 1860, 1894 (1999). In addition, the Act allows states to extend 
Medicaid payments, possibly for cash payments, including providing Medicaid to workers who are 
not actually disabled but who have physical or mental impairments that are “reasonably expected” 
to become severe disabilities in the absence of health care. Id. §§ 201, 204. 
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medically needy or to provide sufficient care to those who are covered. 
Further, it resulted in extraordinary government expenditures. Recall that 
government spending is at sixty percent, and in 2005, health care costs 
reached $1.9 trillion.257 Other countries provide a universal level of 
coverage for their citizens at a similar or lower cost.258 For many 
decades the United States has witnessed advocates, scholars, and 
politicians arguing for universal health care from a variety of moral and 
economic perspectives, but it may be that the recognition of illness as 
universal vulnerability is what will drive future reform efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the passage of the ADA in 1990, disabled individuals have 
continued to face great barriers to entry into the workplace, job 
retention, protected class membership, access to health care, 
transportation, and accommodations that support their preferred methods 
of functioning. Emerging scholarship suggests that remedies for these 
problems lie in the development of social welfare structures to provide 
material supports as well as requirements that employers more 
substantially address barriers to the employment of disabled persons. I 
advocate a mixed civil rights/social welfare approach that requires a 
more responsive and vigilant state and lessens the burden on employers. 
My approach is informed by the view that vulnerability to disability 
as well as the vulnerabilities of disabled individuals are universal and 
constant. Current antidiscrimination law fragments disability protections 
by treating vulnerability as if it arises in discrete situations rather than as 
an aspect of the human condition. To address the universal and constant 
vulnerabilities associated with disability, the reasonable accommodation 
provision must be given a broader social purpose and the interactive 
                                                     
257.  John A. Poisal et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2016: Modest Changes Obscure 
Part D’s Impact, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 21, 2007, at w242–43, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/262/2/w242.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev513n257.pdf. 
258.  See, e.g., CHRIS L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. HEALTH 
CARE SPENDING: COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES 58 (2007), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34175_20070917.pdf (“In 2004, the United States spent more than 
twice as much on health care as the average OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] country, at $6,102 per person (compared with the OECD average of $2,560). Health 
care spending comprised 15.3% of the U.S. GDP in 2004, compared with an average of 8.9% for the 
average OECD country.”), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
83washlrev513n258.pdf. 
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process mandated and developed. The universal vulnerability thesis also 
provides strong arguments that some material supports, such as health 
care, are issues of social welfare rather than disability law. 
 
 
